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In recent years, progressive public intellectuals and prominent scholars have asserted that monopoly power lies at the
root of wealth inequality and that increases in antitrust enforcement are necessary to stem its rising tide. This claim is
misguided. Exercises of market power have complex, crosscutting effects that undermine the generality of the monopoly
regressivity claim. Contrary to what the regressivity critics
assume, wealthy shareholders and senior corporate executives do not capture the preponderance of monopoly rents.
Such profits are broadly shared within and dissipated outside
the firm. Further, many of the subjects of antitrust law are
middle-class professionals, sole proprietors, or small business
owners who extract rents from households above them in the
income distribution. On the consumer side, the monopoly
regressivity claim is confounded by the fact that large swaths
of overcharged goods and services are purchased by government buyers or third-party healthcare payers, who pass on
the incidence of the overcharge progressively, or by other corporate buyers who absorb a share of the overcharge. Even as
to household spending, exercises of monopoly power may
have progressive wealth redistribution effects to the extent
that market power facilitates progressive price discrimination.
Finally, antitrust law sometimes stymies private efforts to redistribute income, further casting doubt on the generality of
the monopoly regressivity claim.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, wealth inequality has reemerged as a popular political issue. President Obama has made reducing
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wealth inequality the signature issue of his second term,1 and
the topic is shaping up as a potentially defining focal point for
the 2016 presidential election.2 Important recent scholarly
work has reignited academic discussion on the incidence,
causes, and cures for wealth inequality.3
Amid this broad debate, a particular claim has emerged
regarding the relationship between market competition and inequality. A wide array of scholars and public intellectuals, including such notable figures as Nobel Laureates Joseph
Stiglitz4 and Paul Krugman5 and former Labor Secretary Robert Reich,6 among others, have claimed that monopoly and
anticompetitive market conditions are among the root causes
of wealth inequality.7 Some of these commentators blame the
1
See Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the President in State of
the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015
[https://perma.cc/E2TT-9WC8]; Barack Obama, U.S. President, Remarks by the
President on Economic Mobility (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility [https://perma
.cc/G5Y8-8VBD].
2
See, e.g., David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as Key Issue in 2016
Presidential Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes
.com/nation/la-na-campaign-income-20150205-story.html [https://perma.cc/
4VUV-7C9K] (noting that popular sentiment has forced both Democratic and
Republican candidates to promise a correction to income inequality); Stiglitz: Inequality a ‘Key Issue’ for US Election 2016, BBC (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-us-canada-32459519 [https://perma.cc/2RZ2-C84A] (asserting that the United States has reached a tipping point for awareness of inequality).
3
See, e.g., ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 126–27
(2015) (claiming that the United States can use competition policy to combat
inequality); THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 291–303 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 2014) (analyzing the historical evolution of inequality); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT
THEM 192–202 (2015) (asserting that corporate welfare and our tax system contribute to America’s growing inequality); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 28–33 (2012) [hereinafter
STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY] (arguing that rent seeking, market forces, societal
norms, and social institutions help create America’s high level of inequality).
4
STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 3, at 53–59.
5
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Robots and Robber Barons, N.Y. TIMES, at A27
(Dec. 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-robots-and-robber-barons.html [https://perma.cc/FT95-JS83].
6
Robert Reich, Antitrust in the New Gilded Age (Apr. 16, 2014), http://
robertreich.org/post/82938136466 [https://perma.cc/D9AH-WX9R]; see Kevin
Roose, Is America Catching Up with Robert Reich’s Income-Inequality Crusade?,
N.Y. MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Sept. 20, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://nymag.com/
daily/intelligencer/2013/09/qa-robert-reich-discusses-inequality-for-all.html
[https://perma.cc/RJJ5-4PLK].
7
See also ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 126–27 (discussing the need for more
robust competition policy to combat inequality); Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C.
Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11–13
(2015) (same); Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267,
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rising tide of wealth inequality on a weak record of antitrust
enforcement in the United States.8 All seem to propose that
enhancing antitrust enforcement against mergers, monopolies,
and anticompetitive agreements could contribute to creating a
more equal society.
This Article challenges this emerging monopoly regressivity
claim in two ways. First, it shows that the relationship between
enforcement of the antitrust laws and wealth inequality is far
more complex than monopoly regressivity critics recognize.
The relationship between market power (the subject of antitrust law) and income distribution is subtle, circumstantially
contingent, and, at least for a developed economy, extremely
difficult to generalize. Whatever their other faults, it is far from
certain that antitrust violations (including cartels, anticompetitive mergers, and abuses of dominance) systematically redirect
wealth from the poor to the rich. To sustain a showing that
they do, one would need information about a large number of
factors, including the relative wealth of producers and consumers, overcharge pass-on rates, the effects of market power on
employees of the firm, the distribution of rents between managers and shareholders, the progressive or regressive effects of
antitrust violations where government entities are the purchasers, and the distribution of rents among classes of managers.
Although there are undoubtedly cases where antitrust violations have regressive effects, there are also undoubtedly many
cases where their effects are progressive or distributively neutral. It is virtually impossible to calculate the net effect on
wealth distribution from general increases or decreases in overall antitrust enforcement.
The second response this Article makes to the monopoly
regressivity claim is that a significant set of antitrust interventions actually impede voluntary efforts to secure a more equitable and just society. In a set of important cases, application of
1292–93 (2016) (arguing that horizontal share ownership by large investors distorts economic competition within industries and causes regressive wealth
redistribution).
8
See STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 3, at 44–45 (asserting that
Chicago School economic theories of competition and antitrust played a role in
creating monopolistic conditions that exacerbated wealth inequality); Baker &
Salop, supra note 7, at 11 (asserting that “[t]he adoption of more permissive
antitrust rules during the past quarter century has . . . likely increased the
prevalence of market power” and with it wealth inequality); Barry C. Lynn, Killing
the Competition: How the New Monopolies Are Destroying Open Markets, HARPER’S
MAG., Feb. 2012, at 27, 32 (arguing that growth of market concentration and
inequality in the United States is attributable to Chicago School arguments in
favor of economic efficiency).

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 5

ANTITRUST AND WEALTH INEQUALITY

30-JUN-16

15:42

1175

conventional antitrust principles frustrated private actors
seeking to promote social justice by diverting market forces
from their ordinary paths.9 Hence, an undifferentiated increase in antitrust enforcement could, in many instances, exacerbate rather than diminish inequality and related forms of
social justice.
To motivate this angle, consider some glimpses of the kinds
of cases in which antitrust has posed an obstacle to private
actors pursuing wealth redistribution goals. Examples include
an antitrust challenge to an agreement by the Ivy League universities on a financial aid system designed to increase educational diversity;10 antitrust concerns preventing garment
manufacturers in the United States from joining forces to pressure foreign suppliers to conform to minimal labor and employment standards;11 and antitrust challenges to National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) rules prohibiting its
members from paying student athletes, which could disrupt
the cross subsidization of women’s athletic programs and other
less popular sporting programs.12 In each of these cases, discussed in greater detail below, there is a plausible argument
that application of unqualified antitrust principles would increase the welfare of consumers but also impair the ability of
private actors to pursue solutions to serious equality problems.
In tandem, these twin objections throw a wrench into the
growing progressive claim that more antitrust enforcement
would lead to a more just distribution of wealth. Not only could
an undifferentiated increase in antitrust enforcement exacerbate wealth inequality in various ways but it could also impede
private, voluntary pursuit of related social justice objectives.
Thus far, this introduction has considered the effect of an
undifferentiated increase in antitrust enforcement—actions to
augment and strengthen enforcement as a general matter,
such as by providing more funding to the antitrust agencies,
liberalizing rules for private enforcement, increasing fines and
penalties, or adopting rules making antitrust claims easier to
win. Changes in the level of antitrust enforcement have no
9

See infra Part II.B.
See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 662–64 (3d Cir. 1993).
11
See Daniel A. Crane & Ben Kobren, Making Antitrust Help, Not Harm Workers Abroad, THE HILL: CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://thehill.com
/blogs/congress-blog/labor/240231-making-antitrust-help-not-harm-workersabroad [https://perma.cc/2CTZ-F9YJ].
12
See Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filedjeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaa-amateur-model [https://perma.cc/2VAE-N668].
10
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clear effect on the regressivity or progressivity of wealth distribution and social justice more generally, but one could try to
tailor antitrust policy to maximize wealth redistribution and
social justice in particular cases. Although it might sometimes
be prudent as a matter of prosecutorial discretion to prioritize
resource allocation in the direction of fighting antitrust violations with highly regressive effects, it would be a mistake to
recalibrate antitrust doctrine in an effort to combat wealth inequality. Even putting aside the likely deleterious effects on
productive and allocative efficiency such doctrinal shifts might
entail, it is impossible to craft a distributively-oriented body of
antitrust law that would reliably increase wealth equality by
clamping down on regressive forms of market power
exploitation.
On the other hand, it may be possible for institutions of
antitrust law to avoid exacerbating wealth inequality by understanding when to get out of the way of private efforts to address
inequality or related social justice objectives. That is to say,
when it comes to wealth equality and social justice in a developed economy, antitrust law cannot be calibrated to help, but it
can be calibrated not to harm. Practically speaking, this means
that courts and agencies could develop doctrines designed to
create space for civil society actors to pursue bona fide wealth
equality and related social justice objectives without undue
interference from antitrust law.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
critiques the progressive claim that increasing antitrust enforcement would diminish wealth inequality. It shows that this
view rests on a simplistic claim that antitrust violations involve
wealth transfers from relatively poor consumers to relatively
rich producers. That claim simply cannot be robustly generalized. Part II presents evidence that antitrust enforcement frequently impedes private efforts to achieve a more just
distribution of wealth by insisting that market actors pursue
competition and output maximization, even when those objectives are inconsistent with wealth redistribution. Finally, Part
III considers potential reforms to antitrust enforcement strategies and doctrines that might advance the cause of equality. It
shows that, apart from targeted instances of prosecutorial discretion, efforts to reconfigure antitrust law to advance the
cause of progressivity are unlikely to be successful. On the
other hand, there is some promise in adapting antitrust law to
avoid discouraging certain private efforts at advancing income
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equality and related social justice objectives, although any
such exemption would need to be narrowly circumscribed.
I
DOES MORE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT MEAN MORE
WEALTH EQUALITY?
A.

The Contingency of Economic Context: The Developing
and Developed Worlds

When it achieves its ostensible purposes,13 antitrust law
causes essentially two economic effects. First, it eliminates
deadweight losses that arise from monopoly pricing and hence
grows the social welfare pie.14 Second, antitrust enforcement
prevents redistribution of wealth from consumers to producers.15 The elimination of deadweight loss has no direct distributive effects, but the consumer-to-producer wealth transfers
have obvious potential effects for the progressive or regressive
redistribution of wealth. If producers, as a class, are wealthier
than consumers, then, at first blush, antitrust violations
should have regressive effects on average.
However, the story is not that uniformly simple. Even
sticking with the reductionist typology of consumers and producers, any analysis of the distributive consequences of antitrust violations must take into account the effects between
classes of producers and classes of consumers. Thus, for example, even if consumers as a class are poorer than producers
as a class, antitrust violations might have progressive effects if
they tended to redistribute wealth from the richest subclasses
of consumers to the poorest subclasses of producers. Or, even
while generally redistributing wealth from consumers to producers, antitrust violations might simultaneously redistribute
wealth from richer consumers to poorer consumers (or vice
versa) or from richer producers to poorer producers (or vice
versa).
The upshot is that the distributive consequences of antitrust violations (and, correspondingly, antitrust enforcement)
13
Of course, antitrust law may in fact cause very different effects from those
that it is ostensibly designed to achieve. See, e.g., William F. Shughart II, PublicChoice Theory and Antitrust Policy, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST:
THE PUBLIC-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 19 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II
eds.,1995) (arguing that antitrust law has tended to favor special interest groups
at the expense of consumers). For purposes of this Article, I assume that antitrust law operates essentially as it is supposed to operate—that is to say, that it
promotes competition for the benefit of efficiency and consumer welfare.
14
See DANIEL A. CRANE, ANTITRUST 6–8 (2014).
15
See id.
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are contingent on particular facts about the economic environment in which they occur. In asking whether changes in the
level of antitrust enforcement have significant progressive or
regressive wealth distribution effects, it is important to specify
a particular economic context in which that question is to be
posed. The answer might very well be different for developing
countries than for more developed ones.
There is a strong a priori argument that the introduction of
competition laws—prohibitions on monopolistic conduct and
agreements—in developing countries can have progressive
wealth redistribution effects. Where wealth and economic
power are heavily concentrated in a few closely held, conglomerate, and vertically integrated enterprises; labor mobility is
low; capital markets are underdeveloped; exclusive legal privileges for incumbents or formerly state-owned enterprises
abound; and trade barriers are high, the introduction of antitrust principles as part of a wider package of liberalization and
development reforms would likely contribute to shrinking the
gap between rich and poor. It is thus not surprising to find that
proponents of antitrust law for developing countries have
stressed the wealth distribution effects of competition and antitrust laws.
In recent years, proponents of competition law have argued
that the adoption of competition principles is an important tool
for generating economic growth for the benefit of the poor in
developing countries.16 Intergovernmental organizations like
the OECD, WTO, and UNCTAD have taken a leading role in
promoting competition law as a means of reducing poverty in
the developing world.17 Other international organizations and
16
See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust:
The Other Path, 13 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 211, 221–24 (2007) (arguing that developing countries should buck the assumption, dominant in the West, that competition law is concerned about economic efficiency and utilize competition policy as
a means of addressing wealth inequality).
17
In 2013, the OECD conducted a policy roundtable on “[c]ompetition and
[p]overty [r]eduction” that ultimately touted competition law as a means of reducing poverty and achieving a superior distribution of wealth. GLOBAL FORUM ON
COMPETITION, DAF/COMP/GF(2013)12, COMPETITION AND POVERTY REDUCTION 5
(2013) http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competition-and-poverty-reduc
tion2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/PLM2-EZNK].
The OECD’s summary of the roundtable gives as an example a 2007 South
African prosecution of a bread cartel that had a disproportionate negative economic impact on low-income people. Id. at 245. The roundtable included submissions from more than twenty developed and developing countries as well as
several other intergovernmental organizations. See id. at 3. Brazil’s submission
characteristically pointed to Brazil’s major fall in the “Gini coefficient” equality
index and attributed it in part to competition law regime in place since 1994. Id.
at 79. At an UNCTAD meeting, the Competition Commission of India presented

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 9

ANTITRUST AND WEALTH INEQUALITY

30-JUN-16

15:42

1179

governments have struck a similar tune. The WTO presents
competition policy as a means of producing poverty reduction.18 Non-governmental organizations have also gotten into
the mix by advocating competition law as an antidote to global
and regional wealth inequality.19
However, advocacy of antitrust law as an antidote to poverty often glosses over a potentially important distinction between increasing the economic position of the poor and
decreasing the wealth gap between rich and poor. Although the
two issues are obviously related, they pose analytically and
empirically distinct questions. Increases in a market’s competitiveness because of antitrust enforcement might improve the
position of the poor without reducing wealth disparity if the
rising tide lifted all boats. For example, if the position of the
poor improved by 10% while the position of the rich improved
by 20%, then poverty would lessen even while inequality
grew.20 If the premise of modern antitrust law—that more
competitive markets increase efficiency—is correct, then competition law enforcement should generate a larger pie, not
merely redistribution within the pie. Still, the progressivity of
competition law remains a broadly accepted article of faith
an argument that cartels have a particularly negative effect on the poor and
competition law would create progressive wealth effects by stimulating economic
growth. See Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy,
Impact of Cartels on the Poor: Competition Law, Poverty Reduction and India, at 18
(July 2013), http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Presentation/IGE2013_PRESImp_
INDIA_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/XC5U-Q8YT].
18
See Robert D. Anderson & Anna Caroline Müller, Competition Policy and
Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach 5 (World Trade Org., Working Paper No.
ERSD-2013-02, 2013), http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201302_
e.htm [http://perma.cc/6XEL-8F3R].
19
A January 2014 Oxfam report makes the case for antitrust enforcement as
a progressive income-distribution vehicle. See RICARDO FUENTES-NIEVA & NICK
GALASSO, OXFAM, WORKING FOR THE FEW: POLITICAL CAPTURE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
15 (2014).
Weak regulatory environments are ideal settings for anti-competitive business practices. Without competition, firms are free to
charge exorbitant prices, which cause consumers to lose out and
ultimately increase economic inequality. When elites exploit weak
or incompetent anti-trust authorities, price gauging follows as a
form of government rent to big business. By not acting when dominant firms crowd out competition, government tacitly permits big
business to capture unearned profits, thereby transferring income
from the less well-off sections of society to the rich. Consumer
goods become more expensive, and if incomes do not rise, inequality
worsens.
Id. (emphasis in original).
20
It is also possible that the growth in inequality would reduce the well-being
of the poor in real terms, even though their income grew in nominal terms, if the
increased wealth and spending of the rich led to inflationary pressures.
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among policy elites in the developing world and I shall not
quarrel with it here.
This matter is different when it comes to the developed—
and economically more complex—world. In societies with liquid capital markets, high degrees of labor mobility, widely held
corporations, low barriers to trade, and relatively low regulatory or legal entry barriers, the case for the progressivity of
antitrust enforcement is correspondingly subtler.
B. The Positive Claim that Antitrust Advances Wealth
Progressivity
Claims that antitrust enforcement contributes significantly
to reducing wealth inequality are not limited to the developing
world. Economists in the United States and Europe have
sounded similar themes for decades. Studies from the 1960s
to the 1980s attempted to empirically measure the effects of
monopolistic market power on wealth distribution. For example, William Comanor and Robert Smiley argued that the reinvestment of legacy monopoly wealth contributes to the longrun growth of inequality.21 A 1987 study by Irene Powell,22
discussed at length in F.M. Scherer and David Ross’s influential Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,23
found that reductions in a market’s four-firm concentration
ratio resulted in a decline in average income for the wealthiest
of six income distribution strata.
With rising levels of public discourse on inequality in recent years, these themes have assumed new prominence.
Some of the claims regarding the relationship between market
power and wealth inequality are implicit in broader claims regarding the root causes of wealth inequality, such as Thomas
Piketty’s much-publicized argument that market-driven economies produce inequality when the return to capital exceeds
economic growth.24 Many progressive, public intellectuals and
scholars in the United States and Europe have gone further,
21
William S. Comanor & Robert H. Smiley, Monopoly and the Distribution of
Wealth, 89 Q.J. ECON. 177, 193 (1975).
22
Irene Powell, The Effect of Reductions in Concentration on Income Distribution, 69 REV. ECON. & STAT. 75, 75–79 (1987).
23
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 679–80 (3d ed. 1990).
24
PIKETTY, supra note 3, at 1 (“When the rate of return on capital exceeds the
rate of growth of output and income, as it did in the nineteenth century and seems
quite likely to do again in the twenty-first, capitalism automatically generates
arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based.”).
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laying the blame for income inequality at the feet of lax antitrust enforcement and proposing invigorating antitrust enforcement as one of several governmental tools to engineer a
more equal society. Claims about the relationship between antitrust enforcement and wealth inequality have come from
some of the most prominent progressive voices speaking on
wealth inequality, which increases the likelihood that such
claims could influence future political action.
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stiglitz offers a conventional neoclassical account of how weak antitrust enforcement leads to
wealth inequality in his 2012 book The Price of Inequality.25
Stiglitz begins with the ordinary economic assumption that in a
fully competitive market there are zero economic profits and
fortunes cannot be built.26 Hence, alterations of competitive
markets that lead to monopoly are the forces that build wealth
inequality.27 Per Stiglitz, the Progressive Era antitrust reforms
were intended to prevent inequality by curtailing monopoly.28
In recent decades, however, the Chicago school of antitrust
analysis, with its emphasis on “free and unfettered markets,”
has eroded antitrust enforcement and thus facilitated the rise
in wealth inequality.29 Stiglitz sees monopolies or highly-concentrated markets in operating systems, telephony, and banking as prime culprits in the unequal distribution of wealth.30
Another Nobel Laureate, Paul Krugman, similarly attributes growing income inequality to the alleged collapse of antitrust enforcement during the Reagan administration.31 Citing a
study by Barry Lynn and Phillip Longman from the New
America Foundation,32 he argues that “increasing business
concentration could be an important factor in stagnating de25

STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 3, at 43–47.
Id. at 43.
27
See id.
28
Id. at 44.
29
Id. at 44–45. For a contrary view on the influence of the Chicago School,
see Daniel A. Crane, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-Chicago, 76 U. CHI. L. REV.
1911, 1916–20 (2009) (reviewing HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK:
THE EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008) (arguing that the Chicago School was not monolithically opposed to
antitrust enforcement and, in several ways, advocated stronger antitrust
enforcement).
30
STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 3, at 44–47.
31
For a contrary view on antitrust enforcement during the Reagan administration, see William E. Kovacic, The Modern Evolution of U.S. Competition Policy
Enforcement Norms, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 377, 416–20 (2003) (arguing that the Reagan administration vigorously enforced the antitrust laws against cartels).
32
Barry C. Lynn & Phillip Longman, Who Broke America’s Jobs Machine?,
WASH. MONTHLY (Mar./Apr. 2010), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1003.lynn-longman.html [https://perma.cc/D8KC-N88G].
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mand for labor, as corporations use their growing monopoly
power to raise prices without passing the gains on to their
employees.”33
Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich has made increasing
antitrust enforcement a major part of his policy prescription for
decreasing income inequality.34 In essays and interviews,
Reich has argued that weak antitrust enforcement leads to
“hidden upward redistribution from the majority of Americans
to corporate executives and wealthy shareholders.”35 He attributes the supposedly ineffective antitrust enforcement to the
excessive power of corporations over the political process.36
Arguing that the toxic combination of weak controls on corporate political contributions and weak antitrust enforcement is a
root cause of income inequality, Reich urges the federal government and his 287,000 Twitter followers37 to take bold antitrust
action: “unless government unrigs [the market] through bold
antitrust action to restore competition, the upward distributions hidden inside the ‘free market’ will become even larger.”38
Similar arguments have been made by European scholars.
In his recent book Inequality: What Can Be Done?, Oxford and
London School of Economics economist Anthony Atkinson argues that the United States has erred in shifting away from the
Sherman Act’s original focus on wealth inequality to a pure
consumer welfare orientation for antitrust law.39 Atkinson argues that competition law can and should expressly take distributional concerns into account.40 He worries that weak
antitrust enforcement will lead to particular harms to poorer
households because when markets have a limited number of
suppliers, those suppliers may choose not to produce goods
desired by the poorest households, such as cheaper cuts of
meat.41 Atkinson concedes that “competition authorities cannot achieve fine-tuned redistribution” but nevertheless urges
33

R

34

R

Paul Krugman, supra note 5, at A27.
Reich, supra note 6; Robert Reich, Whatever Happened to Antitrust? (May
24, 2015), http://robertreich.org/post/119767465905 [http://perma.cc/K3N4YVTV]; see Roose, supra note 6.
35
Reich, supra note 34.
36
See id.
37
Robert Reich (@RBReich), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/RBReich (last visited June 8, 2016).
38
Reich, supra note 34.
39
ATKINSON, supra note 3, at 126.
40
Id. at 126–27.
41
See id. at 127.
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competition authorities to pursue wealth redistribution goals
in enforcing the antitrust laws.42
Arguments in favor of enhancing antitrust enforcement to
combat wealth inequality are appearing with increasing frequency in popular media outlets.43 Academics specializing in
antitrust law have begun to pick up on these themes as well.44
Antitrust enforcement is often depicted as an additional regulatory tool—along with stricter corporate regulation, progressive
taxation, and strengthening employee labor and employment
rights—to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth.45
The most thorough examination of the subject, from two
distinguished economists with substantial expertise in antitrust law, comes in a recent article by Jonathan Baker and
Steven Salop.46 Baker and Salop claim that “[t]he returns from
market power go disproportionately to the wealthy—increases
in producer surplus from the exercise of market power accrue
primarily to shareholders and the top executives, who are
wealthier on average than the median consumer.”47 Since they
42
Id. Atkinson assumes, as do several other public intellectuals writing in
this space, that public enforcement drives antitrust law. In the United States,
however, private enforcement outstrips public enforcement 10 to 1. See Daniel A.
Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2008).
43
See Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Opinion, How America Became Uncompetitive and Unequal, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-america-became-uncompetitive-and-unequal/
2014/06/13/a690ad94-ec00-11e3-b98c-72cef4a00499_story.html [http://per
ma.cc/P8EG-HZK7] (arguing that lax antitrust enforcement creates inequality by
enabling employers to drive down worker wages and creating diminishing opportunities for the middle class to compete and build assets); Eduardo Porter, What
the Debate on Inequality Is Missing, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/06/business/thinking-outside-the-debate-on-income-inequality.html?_r=1 [http://perma.cc/UG4W-62HR] (advocating that government
“reform antitrust law, to broaden its narrow focus on efficiency and explicitly
consider its impact on the distribution of wealth”).
44
See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Occupy Wall Street and Antitrust, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. POSTSCRIPT 33, 40–42, 46–47 (2012) (exploring antitrust angles on the Occupy Wall Street movement and observing that some of the deep unease reflected
by the anticorporatist movement may lie at the feet of income inequalities generated by lax antitrust enforcement); see also Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2575, 2620–25 (2013)
(arguing that lax antitrust enforcement contributes to severely concentrated profits within the financial services industry, causing income inequality between
bankers and average employees); Sandeep Vaheesan, The Evolving Populisms of
Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370, 413 (2014) (“With consumers in general not being
as affluent as shareholders, antitrust enforcement can prevent regressive wealth
transfers from consumers to producers with market power.”).
45
See, e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 44, at 413–14 (arguing that besides antitrust enforcement, tools such as labor and tax laws are also needed to stop the
growing economic inequality).
46
Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 1–5.
47
Id. at 11–12.
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believe that “market power contributes to the development and
perpetuation of inequality,”48 Baker and Salop offer a range of
antitrust responses to reduce inequality. Specifically, they argue for (1) retaining consumer welfare (as opposed to economic
efficiency) as the goal of antitrust law,49 (2) increasing the
budget of the antitrust agencies,50 (3) exercising prosecutorial
discretion to prioritize cases that benefit the middle class and
less advantaged,51 (4) designing remedies to benefit less advantaged consumers,52 (5) creating more interventionist antitrust and regulatory standards,53 (6) recognizing the offense of
excessive pricing by dominant firms,54 and (7) adopting inequality as an explicit competition policy focus.55
In sum, a growing body of technical academic literature,
more popularly focused books and essays by economists and
academics, and public commentary generally advances the
claim that market power acquired through anticompetitive acts
exacerbates wealth inequality and more vigorous antitrust enforcement could contribute toward creating a more equal society. The claims are sufficiently emphatic, detailed, and
common and come from sufficiently influential sources that
they are likely to play an increasing role in progressive political
agendas to combat wealth inequality. It is therefore important
to ask whether the claims are correct.
C. Why the Monopoly Regressivity Claim Is Misguided
The argument that antitrust violations are regressive and
hence that antitrust enforcement is progressive is founded on
two, sometimes unstated, axiomatic assumptions: (1) relatively
rich classes of producers, in particular shareholders and senior
corporate managers, capture the majority of the monopoly
rents generated by anticompetitive behavior and (2) relatively
poorer consumers bear the brunt of monopoly overcharges.56
These assumptions may be generalizable in some circumstances—particularly in the developing world—where the
means of production are concentrated in a very small number
of private hands and the vast bulk of society interacts with
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 13.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 18.
See id.
See id. at 20.
See id. at 21.
See id. at 22.
See id. at 24.
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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capital only as an employee and a consumer.57 But they are far
more difficult to generalize in more economically developed societies where ownership of the means of production is widely
distributed, both in terms of active management and passive
investment, and there exists a broad middle class capable of
appropriating monopoly rents as entrepreneurs, managers, investors, employees, and sellers of assets. As the case for each
of the axioms weakens, the case for the progressivity of antitrust enforcement correspondingly diminishes.58
It is doubtful that antitrust violations involve systematic
transfers from comparatively poor consumers to comparatively
wealthy producers. Almost everyone, both rich and poor, who
participates in markets does so both as a consumer and as a
producer. People participate as producers in their capacities
as employees, sole proprietors, and shareholders. They participate as buyers in their capacities as end consumers, business
purchasers, and taxpayers. Thus, any assertion about the
regressivity of antitrust violations cannot rest on the bare claim
that such violations involve wealth transfers from consumers
to producers.
In order to sustain the claim, there would need to be a
further specification of the ways in which identified classes of
producers skim money from identified classes of consumers.
When the actual operation of market power exercises in developed economies and antitrust enforcement seeking to curtail
them is explored, it becomes apparent that general claims
about the wealth redistribution effects of antitrust violations
and enforcement are extraordinarily difficult to sustain. Monopoly rents are not systematically borne by the poor or col57

See supra text accompanying notes 16–20.
There is a long-standing and well-known debate about whether antitrust
law should focus purely on allocative efficiency or whether it should also concern
itself with wealth transfers from consumers to producers, whether or not such
transfers result in any decline in efficiency. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 82–83 (1978) (arguing that antitrust
law should not be concerned with wealth transfers from consumers to producers),
with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69–70
(1982) (arguing that preventing monopolistic wealth transfers was a central concern of the Sherman Act’s framers). That debate is not at issue for present purposes. The question of progressivity or regressivity is distinct from the question of
wealth transfers from consumers to producers. As discussed further below, it is
possible that consumer-to-producer wealth transfers would have regressive effects if consumers were on average poorer than producers—an assumption that is
difficult to generalize. However, even if it is infeasible to prove regressivity effects
from wealth transfers, there may still be independent, normatively appealing reasons to use antitrust law to resist such wealth transfers. Such arguments are
beyond the scope of this Article.
58
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lected by the wealthy. Rather, in a complex, advanced
economy, the lines of exploitation and profit run in too many
complicated and crosscutting directions to permit broad
generalizations.
1. Who Captures Monopoly Rents?
The primary axiom underlying the claim that antitrust violations are generally regressive is that relatively wealthy producers are capturing most of the rents attributable to
anticompetitive conduct.59 The problem with this assumption
is that “producers” are an extremely diffuse class. Many different classes of producers may have their fingers in the till.
Which producers are capturing the monopoly rents attributable to antitrust violations is a complex and circumstantially
contingent question. As on the consumer side, to be discussed
next, these complexities make it doubtful that any general
claim about the regressive effects of antitrust violations can be
sustained.
a. Shareholders and Senior Managers
Contrary to the assumption underlying the monopoly
regressivity claim, a monopoly position in the market is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for accumulations of
wealth by the capitalist class. For instance, a study by Scherer
and Ross reported that of the twenty-five wealthiest families
reported in Forbes magazine in 1988, “only six owed their fortunes primarily to industries in which profitability depended
crucially upon monopoly positions.”60 According to the study,
six of the other families “became rich by building great enterprises in industries characterized for the most part by vigorous
competition.”61 And most of the others achieved success by
buying assets cheap and selling them high in more competitive
than monopolistic industries.62 Thus, the mere fact of growing
wealth in the hands of the wealthiest owners of capital does not
necessarily point to an increase in market power as a root
cause.
Nonetheless, the assumption underlying the progressive
claim challenged in this Article is that senior managers and
wealthy shareholders of large companies are capturing the majority of the rents attributable to anticompetitive conduct and
59
60
61
62

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 23, at 679–80.
Id. at 680.
See id.
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hence outpacing the modal consumer in the accumulation of
wealth.63 But are CEOs and rich shareholders in fact capturing the lion’s share of monopoly profits? It is far from certain
that they are.
Shareholding is far from an exclusively upper class vocation. Tens of millions of middle class Americans indirectly own
productive capital through defined contribution, defined benefit, or state and local pension plans. In 2012, for example, the
Federal Reserve calculated that pensions controlled 16% of domestic corporate equity assets.64 Participation in these plans
is widely distributed across the population. There are currently 88 million total participants in 401K retirement plans
(73 million of these are active).65 When one adds the large
additional shares of U.S. equities owned by retail investors and
intermediaries such as state and local governments, charitable
trusts and endowments, and depository institutions, it is apparent that gains to shareholders from anticompetitive conduct
are not enjoyed exclusively by the wealthy. At a minimum, the
widely held distribution of share ownership may mitigate the
regressive effect from monopoly power.66
Still, proponents of the view that exercises of market power
tend to be regressive note that corporate shareholding is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of the very
wealthy.67 So the question arises whether corporations are
63
See, e.g., Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 11–12 (“The returns from market
power go disproportionately to the wealthy—increases in producer surplus from
the exercise of market power accrue primarily to shareholders and the top executives, who are wealthier on average than the median consumer.”).
64
GOLDMAN SACHS, AN EQUITY INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO THE FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS
5 (Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.btinvest.com.sg/system/assets/12141/Goldman
%20Sachs%20-%20US%20Strategy%202013%20Mar%2011%20GS.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/E7BB-7NGQ].
65
AM. BENEFITS COUNCIL, 401(K) FAST FACTS 1 (Apr. 2014), http://www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents2013/401k_stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N2YB-28C6].
66
See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 23, at 680–81 (observing that the wide
incidence of shareholding by intermediary institutions could mitigate the regressive effects of monopoly but arguing that pension fund beneficiaries likely do not
capture the benefits of capital gains from monopolies).
67
Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 12 n.47 (citing Edward N. Wolff, Household
Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962–2013: What Happened over the Great
Recession? 56 tbl.7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20733,
Dec. 2014, http://www.nber.org/papers/w20733.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6FBXD7P]) (“[A]s of 2013, the top 1% of the wealth distribution hold 49.8% of stock
and mutual fund assets . . . ; if indirect ownership through retirement plans and
similar accounts is taken into account, the top 10% own 81.4% of those assets.”);
see also Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States:
Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze—an Update to 2007, at 19–20, http://
www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_58589.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6FB-XD7P] (“[I]n
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passing a large share of monopoly profit through to their shareholders—a necessary condition for the regressive shareholder
effect. Perhaps surprisingly, the case that they are is murky.
Monopoly is not free money to corporations—it has to be
purchased. As Richard Posner has shown, one of the significant social costs of monopoly is that firms invest considerable
sums of money in attempting to acquire monopoly profits and,
once they have them, to retain them.68 In neoclassical economic terms, these expenditures to obtain monopoly rents are
considered economic waste since they benefit neither consumers nor producers.69 In more practical terms, the cost of acquiring and maintaining monopoly power is a significant drag
on the profitability of monopoly to shareholders. Empirical
work has cast doubt on whether firms in concentrated industries earn greater average profits than other firms,70 implying
either that increases in concentration do not create market
power or market power is not cheap to acquire and maintain. If
firms are spending a large share of their rents to obtain monopoly power, the remaining margins left for shareholders may be
relatively small.
Monopoly rents are not captured uniformly by the owners
of capital (i.e., shareholders) but are distributed in various
complex ways throughout the firm.71 Perhaps executive suite
managers benefit disproportionately at the expense not only of
the firm’s customers but also its shareholders; for example,
they could leverage short-run income gains from antitrust violations to justify higher compensation even though shareholders do not realize long-term value. The evidence on that will be
considered in a moment. But it is also possible that monopoly
2007 the richest 1 percent of households held about half of all outstanding stock,
financial securities, trust equity, and business equity . . . . The top 10 percent of
families as a group accounted for about 85 to 90 percent of stock shares, bonds,
trusts, business equity . . . .”).
68
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11–12
(1976) (“[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of
monopoly profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to
monopolize . . . .”).
69
See id.
70
See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES 67–69 (1963) (finding the average rate of return of monopolistic industries to be almost the same as that of competitive industries); Michael Salinger,
The Concentration-Margins Relationship Reconsidered, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECON. ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 287, 319 (“[T]he results suggest that increases in
concentration may eventually result in increased costs and prices.”).
71
See Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV.
1463, 1465 (2001) (“[R]ents give managers slack and attract grabs by players
inside the firm.”).
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rents are captured by midlevel managers at the expense of both
senior managers and shareholders. For example, midlevel
managers and other firm employees may expend considerable
firm resources to exclude rivals simply to obtain John Hicks’s
famous “quiet life”72 or internally expend monopoly profits
through the wastefulness and sloth qualities of monopoly identified by Judge Learned Hand in his famous Alcoa decision.73
Indeed, it is a common assumption in antitrust law that many
monopolists do not show high economic profits on their balance sheets, as Alcoa did not, but rather internally dissipate
monopoly rents through complacency.74 In such cases, the
shareholder regressivity effect from product market monopoly
would shrink or vanish altogether.
Further evidence against the claim that shareholders are
regressively grabbing a large share of monopoly rents comes
from another progressive critique of antitrust law—that large
corporate mergers do not in fact produce positive returns to the
shareholders of the acquiring firm, but rather negative ones.75
72
J. R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3
ECONOMETRICA 1, 8 (1935) (“[Monopolists] are likely to exploit their advantage
much more by not bothering to get very near the position of maximum profit, than
by straining themselves to get very close to it. The best of all monopoly profits is
a quiet life.”).
73
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power deadens
initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur
of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well
enough alone.”).
74
See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff’d per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (“The very absence of strong
competitors implies that there cannot be an objective measuring rod of the monopolist’s excellence, and the test of its performance must, therefore, be largely
theoretical. What appears to the outsider to be a sensible, prudent, nay even a
progressive policy of the monopolist, may in fact reflect a lower scale of adventurousness and less intelligent risk-taking than would be the case if the enterprise
were forced to respond to a stronger industrial challenge. Some truth lurks in the
cynical remark that not high profits but a quiet life is the chief reward of monopoly power.”); Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV.
L. REV. 281, 310 (1956) (“Monopoly gives not only the power to control price and
exclude competitors but also the choice of dissipating that power through indolence and ‘the quiet life.’”).
75
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal
Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT
OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 256 (Robert Pitofsky
ed., 2008) (arguing that antitrust law has been too sanguine about the efficiencies
attributable to corporate mergers and that corporate mergers often do not benefit
shareholders of the acquiring company); Spencer Weber Waller, Corporate Governance and Competition Policy, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 833, 874 (2011) (“[C]ertain
categories of mergers destroy shareholder value and do little, if anything, to create
meaningful efficiencies or to enhance market competition.”).
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These claims are generally based on economic studies showing
that the shareholders of acquiring firms experience negative
returns in various windows after the relevant corporate acquisitions.76 In light of such studies, progressives claim that corporate mergers are often not genuine efforts to create
efficiencies and hence build wealth for the benefit of shareholders, but rather “kingdom building” exercises by narcissistic
CEOs.77 If that claim is correct, then shareholders do not reap
a large share of the monopoly profits attributable to anticompetitive mergers.78
76
See CHRISTIAN FUNKE, Information Signaling and Competitive Effects of M&A:
Long-Term Performance of Rival Companies, in SELECTED ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL ASSET
PRICING 9, 36–37 (2008) (ebook); DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F. M. SCHERER, MERGERS,
SELL-OFFS, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 207–10 (1987); Anup Agrawal et al., The PostMerger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN.
1605, 1610–11 (1992); Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives
on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 103, 110–11 (2001) (summarizing several studies
between 1973 and 1998 and finding abnormal negative returns to acquiring
shareholders of 3.8%); Marc Goergen & Luc Renneboog, Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-Border Takeover Bids, 10 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 9,
23 tbl.6 (2004) (focusing on takeovers in the U.K. between 1993 and 2000 and
finding negative abnormal returns to acquiring shareholders of 1.65%); Tim
Loughran & Anand M. Vijh, Do Long-Term Shareholders Benefit from Corporate
Acquisitions?, 52 J. FIN. 1765, 1774–75 (1997); Sara B. Moeller et al., Wealth
Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring-Firm Returns in the Recent
Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757, 761 (2005); P. Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen,
Glamour, Value and the Post-acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN.
ECON. 223, 235–36 (1998); Ulrike Malmendier et al., Winning by Losing: Evidence
on the Long-Run Effects of Mergers 19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 18024, 2012). But see Henk Peer, The Netherlands, 1962–1973, in THE
DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF MERGERS 163, 187 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1980)
(concluding that the horizontal acquiring firms gradually perform better than the
industry average with respect to return on stock and “the conglomerate acquiring
firms do better than the predicted performance only in the period immediately
after the merger”); Shantanu Dutta & Vijay Jog, The Long-Term Performance of
Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly, 33, J. BANKING & FIN. 1400,
1406 (2009) (“[B]y using both an event-time approach and a calendar-time approach, we do not find any strong support for long-term underperformance for
acquiring firms in the post-acquisition period.”); Sandra Betton et al., Corporate
Takeovers 74 (Tuck Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-47, 2008), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1131033 [http://perma.cc/
R62E-LLGH] (“[W]hen using the rolling portfolio technique, there is no evidence of
abnormal stock returns following mergers.”).
77
See, e.g., Baker & Shapiro, supra note 75, at 256 (“This evidence supports
the view that many mergers are motivated by managerial hubris, perhaps exacerbated by distorted managerial compensation schemes, and that managers often
underestimate integration problems.”).
78
One might argue that shareholders do not gain from nonanticompetitive
corporate mergers, since there are not often efficiencies to be exploited, but that
they do gain from monopolistic mergers because there are monopoly rents to be
exploited. But such a claim could not be squared with the claim that lax antitrust
enforcement in the last several decades is a significant cause of the growing
wealth inequality. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58. If the set of all
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Turning now to top corporate managers, the question is
whether managers are in fact able to extract significant monopoly profits in terms of executive compensation. There is no
clear evidence that they are. Empirical studies find that the
relationship between increases in product market competition
and managerial compensation is ambiguous.79 For instance, a
study by Patricia Funk & Gabrielle Wanzenreid found a decrease in executive compensation with an increase in competition in industries such as paper, wood products, petroleum,
chemicals, plastics, and minerals but an increase in executive
compensation with increases in competition in the metal product manufacturing, machinery, computers and electronics,
electrical equipment, transportation equipment, furniture, and
general manufacturing industries.80 No general effect on increasing compensation was observed.
Other literature suggests that, if anything, increases in
product market competition might increase managerial compensation. A leading critique of corporate compensation claims
that prevailing corporate compensation structures inflate managerial compensation by disproportionately rewarding managers based on general market profitability rather than individual
corporate performance.81 Other literature shows that the use
of relative performance evaluations, which compensate managers based on the performance of their own company compared
to the performance of other firms in the same industry, decreases as the competitiveness of the industry increases.82 The
consummated mergers in the last several decades includes both monopolistic
ones contributing significantly to wealth inequality because rich shareholders
realized significant gains and nonmonopolistic ones, then one would expect to see
positive returns to shareholders on average.
79
Patricia Funk & Gabrielle Wanzenried, Product Market Competition and
Executive Compensation: An Empirical Investigation, at 4 (Universität Bern Diskussionsschriften, Working Paper No. 03-09, 2003), http://www.vwl.unibe.ch/
papers/dp/dp0309.pdf [http://perma.cc/8SSM-439W] (“[O]ur results are consistent with the literature which posits an ambiguous relationship between competition and executive compensation . . . .”); see also Vicente Cuñat & Maria
Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Product Market Competition 19 (Ctr. for
Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4425, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=562446 [http://perma.cc/8HGC-MYRZ] (finding
that a higher level of product market competition increases performance pay
sensitivity of executive compensation schemes).
80
Funk & Wanzenried, supra note 79, at 3–4, 42 tbls 32 & 33.
81
See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 138–39
(2004) (showing that corporate executive compensation is 70% driven by general
market profitability and 30% driven by firm-specific performance).
82
See Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, Executive Compensation,
Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence,
54 J. FIN. 1999, 2000 (1999).
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intuition behind these empirical results is that compensating
senior managers based on the negative performance of peer
firms induces those managers to take actions that dilute the
profitability of the industry.83 Hence, from a principal-agent
perspective, a more competitive market structure may increase
the principal’s incentive to reward managers in ways that may
lead to more inflated pay structures. Antitrust enforcement
that increased market competitiveness could produce the unintended byproduct of increased executive compensation.
In sum, the argument that senior managers are the primary beneficiaries of anticompetitive market structures is
weak, at best. And while shareholders may capture some of the
gains from monopoly pricing, any such regressivity effect is
weaker than assumed in the monopoly regressivity claim.
b. The Labor Monopoly Wage Premium and Spillovers
Outside the Firm
Contrary to the assumption that shareholders and senior
managers are capturing virtually all of the monopoly rents obtained by corporations, the evidence suggests that a significant
amount of rent sharing occurs within the firm. As Mark Roe
has noted, “[e]mployees of monopoly firms can, and do, ally
with capital to split the rents, to facilitate constricting production and raising price, and to seek barriers to competitive entry.”84 Empirical evidence shows that nonunion employees see
higher wages as the market concentration of their industry
increases and also that higher seller concentration leads to
stronger unionization, which in turn leads to higher wages.85
83
See id. (“Although the relative performance evaluation contract reduces the
executive’s exposure to risk, it provides incentives to take actions that lower
industry returns.”).
84
Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2068 (2001).
85
See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 23, at 682 (surveying literature); John S.
Heywood, Labor Quality and the Concentration-Earnings Hypothesis, 68 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 342, 345 (1986) (analyzing panel data to confirm relationship between increase in product market concentration and wages); Thomas Karier, Unions and Monopoly Profits, 67 REV. ECON. & STAT. 34, 41 (1985) (reporting that
unionization leads to a reduction in a firm’s monopoly profits in concentrated
industries, since unionized workers capture a share of the monopoly rents generated by the corporation); see also Walter Y. Oi & Todd L. Idson, Firm Size and
Wages, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds.,
1999) (“A worker who holds a job in a large firm is paid a higher wage . . . .”);
William E. Even & David A. Macpherson, Is Bigger Still Better? The Decline of the
Wage Premium at Large Firms (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Working Paper No.
4082, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1369828
[http://perma.cc/5L6M-UMSJ] (“[A] summary of empirical studies shows that the
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The monopoly labor wage premium has been observed across a
variety of industries.86 For present purposes, the monopoly
labor wage premium is important because it suggests the ability of blue-collar workers to extract significant monopoly rents
from their employers, thus counterbalancing any regressive effects from shareholder or senior management rent extraction.87
Consistent with the evidence that increases in market
power yield higher wages for blue-collar employees, there is
evidence of labor union support for large corporate mergers
that raise serious competitive issues. For example, the Communication Workers of America came out in favor of the AT&T
and T-Mobile merger that the Federal Communications Commission and the Justice Department both opposed, and that
AT&T and Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile’s parent corporation,
ultimately withdrew from.88 An editorial published in the Huffington Post explained that progressives should support the
proposed merger “[b]ecause AT&T is the ONLY unionized wireless company in the country and the merger would ensure that
20,000+ T-Mobile workers would have the chance to join the
43,000 currently unionized AT&T Mobility employees with delargest firms (e.g., firms with 500 or more employees) pay wages that are 30-50
percent higher than the smallest firms (e.g., firms with less than 25 employees).”).
86
See George J. Borjas & Valerie A. Ramey, Foreign Competition, Market
Power, and Wage Inequality, 110 Q.J. ECON. 1075, 1078 (1995); David Card, The
Impact of Deregulation on the Employment and Wages of Airline Mechanics, 39
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 527, 537 (1986); Maria Guadalupe, Product Market Competition, Returns to Skill, and Wage Inequality, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 439, 442 (2007)
(surveying literature); Ana L. Revegna, Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on Employment and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing, 107 Q.J. ECON. 255,
277 (1992).
87
Baker and Salop dismiss the market-power wage effect, asserting that it
has “limited practical importance today with the decline of private sector unionization.” Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 12. However, even if only 6.6% of private
sector employees are unionized, unionization rates are considerably higher in
certain sectors that have been of particular antitrust concern, such as transportation and warehousing (18.9%) and telecommunications (13.3%). Press Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Member Summary 1–2 (Jan. 28, 2016), http://
www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZQX9-BPYC]. Further, increasing concentration leads to increasing unionization, and the monopoly
labor wage premium is observed in nonunionized markets. See Guadalupe, supra
note 86, at 469; Karier, supra note 85, at 37.
88
See Order at 1, In re AT&T Inc. & Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to
Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses & Authorizations, WT Docket No. 11-65
(F.C.C. 2011); Comments of Commc’ns Workers of Am. at 1, In re AT&T Inc. &
Deutsche Telekom AG for Consent to Assign or Transfer Control of Licenses &
Authorizations, WT Docket No. 11-65 (F.C.C. 2011); Tom Schoenberg, T-Mobile
Antitrust Challenge Gives AT&T Little Recourse, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Sept. 1, 2011,
9:55 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-08-31/u-s-files-antitrust-complaint-to-block-proposed-at-t-t-mobile-merger [http://perma.cc/TZF9W97U].
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cent wages and legal protections on the job.”89 Similarly, the
three airline employee unions supported American Airlines’
questionable merger with US Airways, believing that employees
would fare better in the combined company.90
A related point concerns the differentiating effects among
different classes of workers from increases in product market
competition. Such competition may increase wage inequality
by shifting demand in favor of skilled labor at the expense of
unskilled labor, with the effect that a wage gap grows between
skilled and unskilled labor.91 Such instances of income stratification have ambiguous effects on the overall distribution of
wealth but would likely be regressive on net since they would
shift down the average salaries of workers at the lowest end of
the income distribution.
The progressive effects of market power–enhancing mergers may go beyond the financially quantifiable and spill outside
the boundaries of the firm. Civil rights organizations have supported controversial mergers, arguing that the combined firm
would cater better to the needs of minorities. For example, the
Reverend Al Sharpton played a leading role in supporting the
Comcast and NBC Universal merger, arguing that the deal
would enhance racial diversity in broadcasting.92 The NAACP
supported the AT&T and T-Mobile merger, arguing that AT&T
had been a progressive corporate citizen that would bring a
better culture to T-Mobile’s employment conditions and con-

89
Nathan Newman, Pro-Labor Progressives Should Support the AT&T - TMobile Merger, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/prolabor-progressives-sho_b_883321
.html [http:// perma.cc/RD37-BK35].
90
See Mike Spector & Susan Carey, American Airlines Unions Support US
Airways Merger, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 19, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303425504577354493373319140 [http://
perma.cc/QP8K-D43F].
91
See Ramon Marimon & Vincenzo Quadrini, Competition, Human Capital
and Income Inequality with Limited Commitment, 146 J. ECON. THEORY 976,
1001–02 (2008); Maria Guadalupe, Does Product Market Competition Increase
Wage Inequality? 28 (Apr. 23, 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.iza
.org/en/webcontent/events/transatlantic/papers_2003/guadalupe.pdf [http://
perma.cc/PB8Q-796A].
92
Sharpton was later criticized for entering into a lucrative contract with a
subsidiary of the merged company, MSNBC, in what some commentators described as a reward for his support for the deal. Wayne Barrett, Al Sharpton’s
Radio Power Play, DAILY BEAST (July 28, 2011, 11:20 PM), http://www.thedaily
beast.com/articles/2011/07/28/al-sharpton-comcast-nbc-merger-anothernew-conflict-of-interest.html [http://perma.cc/778N-4EVX].

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

2016]

unknown

Seq: 25

ANTITRUST AND WEALTH INEQUALITY

30-JUN-16

15:42

1195

tracting practices.93 It also supported the Sirius and XM
merger, which resulted in a monopoly in satellite radio.94
Other civil rights organizations have similarly weighed in favor
of mergers ultimately challenged on antitrust grounds.95
At a minimum, the monopoly labor wage premium and
evidence of union and civil rights organization support for competitively controversial corporate mergers should call into
question the progressive argument that stronger merger enforcement would advance progressive wealth redistribution.
Many interests within and without the firm have an opportunity to extract monopoly rents or otherwise benefit from business reorganizations that contribute to the creation of market
power.
c. Noncorporate Subjects of Antitrust Law
The progressive argument for enhanced antitrust enforcement on wealth inequality grounds assumes that large corporate actors are the principal subjects of antitrust law and
enforcement. However, apart from a portion of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which applies solely to the acquisition of securities,96 the prohibition of the antitrust laws is not limited to
corporate entities but applies generally. The antitrust laws apply to any persons who engage in anticompetitive behavior,
93
See Hilary Shelton, NAACP, Letter to the Editor, AT&T Merger with TMobile: The N.A.A.C.P’s View, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/07/15/opinion/l15naacp.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CF4D-PHU6].
94
See Charles LaRocca, NAACP Supports Satellite Radio Merger, SIRIUS BUZZ
(June 30, 2007, 2:54 PM), http://siriusbuzz.com/naacp-supports-satellite-radiomerger.php [http://perma.cc/3MGX-HFFH].
95
In one of the strangest merger stories in recent years, the Gay & Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), a leading LGBT organization, initially supported the AT&T/T-Mobile merger, arguing that “faster wireless” was somehow
connected to “social justice.” Michelangelo Signorile, How Gay Media Helped Sink
the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger, HUFFINGTON POST QUEER VOICES: THE BLOG (Feb. 19,
2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michelangelo-signorile/howgay-media-helped-sink_b_1160449.html [http://perma.cc/G3G8-KBCN] (quoting a letter from Jarrett Barrios, President, GLAAD, & Justin Nelson, President &
Co-founder, Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Chamber of Commerce, to Julius Genachowski,
Chairman, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n (May 31, 2011), http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7021682707). However, after the emergence of allegations of
favor trading on the GLAAD board, the group withdrew its support. See id.
96
See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (“No person engaged in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any
part of the stock or other share capital . . . .”). The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950
closed the asset loophole in Section 7 and made the statute applicable to asset
acquisitions as well. Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950) (“[A]nd no
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall
acquire the whole or any part of the assets . . . .”); see PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., 4
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 903–04 (1998).
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whether large corporations or hot dog vendors on opposite
street corners.97 This point is not merely theoretical. The antitrust laws extensively regulate the market behavior of
noncorporate actors. It bears recalling that out of the first
thirteen successful antitrust cases, only one involved a combination of capitalists, with the majority involving labor combinations.98 Since that time, the creation of statutory and
nonstatutory labor exemptions from the antitrust laws has mitigated—if not entirely stopped—the direct use of antitrust law
against labor organizations.99 However, a wide swath of antitrust enforcement continues to be focused on noncorporate
actors, with confounding effects for claims about the regressivity of market power exercises.
Many of the producers whose commercial arrangements
antitrust authorities have challenged in recent decades are not
large corporations but professionals such as doctors, dentists,
engineers, lawyers, real estate brokers, stock brokers, and
small business owners involved in trade associations.100 While
in some cases members of the petty bourgeoisie and professional classes may be wealthier on average than their clients,
thus implying regressive effects from antitrust violations, in
many cases the effects of the antitrust violations are likely
progressive, since the regulated classes would otherwise extract income from clients up the income distribution from
themselves. As with most of these questions, the effects on
income distribution are simply too complex to ascertain economy-wide.
In the past several years, a large portion of the Federal
Trade Commission’s (FTC) docket has centered on anticompetitive rules and practices by trade associations organizing and
regulating middle class professions. Take, for instance, the
FTC’s 2014 enforcement action against the Music Teachers
97
See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1, 43–46
(2008) [hereinafter Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism] (explaining the reach of federal
antitrust laws to natural persons); Daniel A. Crane, The Dissociation of Incorporation and Regulation in the Progressive Era and the New Deal 1 (forthcoming)
(explaining the rejection of proposals during the Progressive Era and New Deal to
focus antitrust prohibitions specifically on corporations).
98
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836–1937, at 229
(1991).
99
See Milton Handler & William C. Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the
Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459,
481 (1981).
100
See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1118–30
(2014).
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National Association based on an ethical rule prohibiting music
teachers from soliciting clients from rival teachers.101 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, music, art, and drama
teachers average a squarely middle-class income of
$66,260.102 In recent years, the FTC has also brought an enforcement action against property managers,103 with an average annual income of $65,880,104 and legal support
professionals,105 with an average annual income of $52,830.106
Professional lighting and sign managers107 and ice-skating
coaches108 have also felt the FTC’s wrath over anticompetitive
agreements in the last two years.
The Justice Department has brought similar suits. For
example, in 2005 it successfully sued to enjoin the National
Association of Realtors from preventing its members from using password-protected Internet sites that enabled the brokers’
customers to search for and receive real estate “multiple listing
services” listings over the Internet.109 If the Justice Department’s factual allegations were correct, the Association’s restriction inhibited competition among brokers that would have
“place[d] downward pressure on brokers’ commission rates.”110
In other words, the restriction facilitated a wealth transfer from
home sellers to realtors. The median income of home sellers,
101
In re Music Teachers Nat’l Ass’n, No. C-4448, 2014 WL 1396512, at *1–3
(F.T.C. Apr. 3, 2014).
102
Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: Art, Drama, & Music
Teachers, Postsecondary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www
.bls.gov/oes/current/oes251121.htm [http://perma.cc/2XTV-ZD5E].
103
See In re Nat’l Ass’n of Residential Prop. Managers, Inc., No. C-4490, 2014
WL 5298210, at *1–3 (F.T.C. Oct. 1, 2014).
104
See Occupational Employment and Wages, May 2014: Property, Real Estate, and Community Association Managers, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 25,
2015), http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes119141.htm [http://perma.cc/
4WEE-FWFQ].
105
See In re Cal. Ass’n of Legal Support Prof’ls, No. C-4447, 2014 WL
1396499, at *1–3 (F.T.C. Apr. 3, 2014).
106
See May 2014 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates
United States, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/
oes/current/oes_nat.htm#23-0000 [http://perma.cc/53NZ-RK5W].
107
See In re Prof’l Lighting & Sign Mgmt. Cos. of Am., No. C-4507, 2015 WL
1088940, at *1–3 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2015).
108
See In re Prof’l Skaters Ass’n, No. C-4509, 2015 WL 1088939, at *1–5
(F.T.C. Feb. 13, 2015).
109
Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 5–6, United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors,
No. 05 C 5140 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/amended-complaint-6 [http://perma.cc/ZH5U-WNL6]. The suit ended in a
consent decree requiring the realtors to abandon the allegedly anticompetitive
restrictions. Final Judgment at 6–9, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 05 C 5140 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/final-judgment142 [http://perma.cc/Z88G-KLXL].
110
Amended Complaint, supra note 109, at ¶ 3.
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who typically bear the incidence of real estate commissions, is
approximately $97,500111 and that of realtors is $43,430.112
Thus, on average, higher commissions would allow realtors to
extract income from clients with more than double their income. The effect of the antitrust enforcement decision was to
redistribute that income back up to the sellers.
The effects of antitrust enforcement on noncorporate, middle-class actors cannot be dismissed as insignificant. In the
Realtors case, the Justice Department alleged that virtual office
website brokers, whose activities the challenged rule tended to
suppress, had offered discounted commission rates that had
saved their customers tens of millions of dollars in commissions.113 Given the sheer volume of existing home sales in the
United States—$1.2 trillion per year114—even a comparatively
small change in broker commission rates due to increased
competition would have very significant economic effects. For
example, a reduction in the average broker commission from
5.5% to 4.5%115 would redistribute $12 billion annually from
brokers to their clients with strongly regressive effects.
To be clear, my point here is not to criticize the agencies for
bringing antitrust cases with regressive wealth redistribution
effects. There are many sound reasons for agencies to bring
these cases. Rather, the point is that claims that the chief
beneficiaries of monopoly power are large corporate shareholders and managers is altogether too facile. The actual operation
of the antitrust laws, both in terms of the cases that are publicly brought and their often invisible deterring effects, is considerably broader.
111
NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, HOME BUYER AND SELLER GENERATIONAL TRENDS 77
Exhibit 6-2 (Mar. 2014), http://www.realtor.org/sites/default/files/reports/
2014/2014-home-buyer-and-seller-generational-trends-report-full.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5459-M6A9].
112
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/realestate-brokers-and-sales-agents.htm [http://perma.cc/L4JF-2CSF].
113
See Competitive Impact Statement at 7, Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, No. 05 C
5140, http://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/competitive-impact-statement-160 [http://perma.cc/BC89-RRX2].
114
LAWRENCE YUN ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, 2014 PROFILE OF INTERNATIONAL
HOME BUYING ACTIVITY: PURCHASES OF U.S. REAL ESTATE BY INTERNATIONAL CLIENTS FOR
THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 2014, at 3 (June 2014) (reporting a U.S.
existing home sale market of $1.2 trillion during the period of April 2013 through
March 2014).
115
Home Prices and Commissions Over Time, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 2,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/home-prices-and-commissions-over-time
[http:// perma.cc/5AVJ-8PKR] (reporting steady average commission of 5.5% to
5.0% over the last decade and observing that if competition among brokers were
effective, commission rates should have declined as home values increased).
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2. Who Pays Monopoly Rents?
Contemporary antitrust enforcement is justified as protecting the welfare of “consumers.”116 In antitrust parlance, the
consumer has become a ubiquitous shorthand identification.
Any purchaser is effectively a “consumer” in antitrust discourse. Thus, antitrust institutions fret about losses of consumer welfare when antitrust violations lead to price increases,
whether or not there is evidence that consumers in the proper
sense end up paying higher prices.117 For present purposes,
the distinction between “consumer welfare” as a slogan and
actual regressive overcharges to end consumers is important
because anticompetitive conditions in many markets have little
effect on actual consumers in the sense of the consumer/producer dichotomy assumed by those who argue that antitrust
violations are regressive. And, even when genuine consumers—in the sense of household customers—are the purchaser,
there is no general case that exercises of market power tend to
be regressive.
a. Taxpayers and Third-Party Payers
The first difficulty in equating overcharges to “consumers”
with regressive excises by wealthy corporations is that the purchasers to whom monopolists sell are often not household customers but large intermediary organizations, which may
distribute the incidence of monopoly charges progressively.
This is particularly true of government purchasers and the
health care insurance system, which amount to large swaths of
the economy.
In the United States, federal government spending accounted for $3.5 trillion or nearly one-fourth of GDP in
2013.118 State and local governments accounted for another
$1.58 and $1.77 trillion respectively.119 Many of these expend116
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the
Sherman Act as a ‘consumer welfare prescription.’” (quoting BORK, supra note 58,
at 66)).
117
See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
492–94 (1968) (allowing a treble damages suit by a direct corporate purchaser of
goods without regard to whether overcharges were passed along to household
consumers).
118
ROMINA BOCCIA ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., FEDERAL SPENDING BY THE NUMBERS, 2013: GOVERNMENT SPENDING TRENDS IN GRAPHICS, TABLES, AND KEY POINTS 1
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/08/federalspending-by-the-numbers-2013) [http://perma.cc/2MFM-D94N].
119
Christopher Chantrill, What Is the Total US Government Spending?, U.S.
GOV. SPENDING, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/ [http://perma.cc/
4FAX-ZJTA].
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itures go to buying goods and services in markets. The World
Bank calculates that general government final consumption
(all government expenditures for purchases of goods and services) in the United States was 15% of GDP in 2013.120 In large
slices of the economy (i.e., defense, health care, building materials and contracting, and education) the government is the purchaser and payer.121
Of course, taxpayers are the ultimate shareholders of the
government and end up paying its bills. Putting aside generational issues created by deficit spending and debt (which raise
their own questions of equality), monopoly overcharges in public procurement are passed through to taxpayers in accordance
with the distributional baseline of the tax code. Thus, as to
large segments of the economy, the regressivity or progressivity
of antitrust violations simply mirrors the regressivity or
progressivity of the tax code (at least on the incidence of the
overcharge side of the ledger).122 To the extent that the tax
code is progressive, which the U.S. tax system generally is,123
antitrust violations involving public procurement (imagine, for
example, anticompetitive mergers in the defense industry or
bid rigging for public works projects) could have progressive
rather than regressive effects.124
Health care, which antitrust law has had a great deal to say
about in recent years,125 is another major segment of the econ120
General Government Final Consumption Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD
BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.CON.govT.ZS [https://perma.cc/
Q5DC-JX77].
121
See Chantrill, supra note 119.
122
The distribution of the gains from monopoly pricing are considered in Part
I.C.1 above.
123
See KEVIN PERESE, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD
INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES, 2011, at 3 fig.1 (Nov. 2014), http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/49440-Distribution-of-Income-andTaxes.pdf [http://perma.cc/P47Y-RZDH] (showing that top quintile of income
distribution pays approximately 70% of federal taxes); Jeffrey Rohaly, Tax Policy
Center, Tax Policy Briefing Book: Distribution: Are Federal Taxes Progressive, TAX
POLICY CTR. (June 19, 2008), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/
background/distribution/progressive-taxes.cfm [http://perma.cc/5M5D-SHPY]
(“Taken as a whole, the federal tax system is progressive: on average, households
with higher incomes pay a larger share of their income in federal tax than do those
with lower incomes.”).
124
For an example of how the Reagan administration vigorously enforced the
antitrust laws against public contracting cartels, see Kovacic, supra note 31, at
417, arguably as part of a larger ideological push to lower public burdens on
taxpayers.
125
See, e.g., Competition in the Health Care Marketplace, FTC, https://www
.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/industry-guidance/health-care
[http://perma.cc/CH3C-KJL3] (summarizing a variety of activities the FTC undertakes to promote competition in health care).
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omy in which the consumer is often not the direct or even
necessarily the ultimate payer. Rather, health care spending is
largely mediated through a complex, regulated insurance system with significant redistributive effects. Health care spending in the United States accounted for 17.1% of the economy in
2013.126 Of this, public spending (Medicare and Medicaid)
amounted to around one trillion dollars in 2014, which is already included in the previously discussed governmental expenditure figure.127 Private health insurance amounted to
$991 billion and out-of-pocket expenditures amounted to
$329.8 billion.128 Overcharges to private health insurers result
in premium increases that operate very much like a tax, since
they are borne by third-party payers regardless of present consumption. Monopoly overcharges mirror the progressivity or
regressivity of the underlying system of health insurance premiums and related tax credits. The Affordable Care Act is designed to have highly progressive wealth redistribution
effects.129 This implies that exercises of market power that
increase costs to health insurers (for example, reverse payment
settlements between pharmaceutical companies)130 will be
passed on to consumers progressively, with the wealthy bearing a high share of the costs.
126
Health Expenditure, Total (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank
.org/indicator/SH.XPD.TOTL.ZS [https://perma.cc/JP8Q-TZES].
127
National Health Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statis
tics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22YG-BBFX].
128
Id.
129
See Henry J. Aaron & Gary Burtless, Potential Effects of the Affordable Care
Act on Income Inequality, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www
.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/01/potential-effects-affordable-care-actincome-inequality-aaron-burtless [http://perma.cc/R9FT-4AHU] (reporting that
the Affordable Care Act will result in Americans in the bottom 10% of the income
distribution seeing an average jump of 7.2% in income, those in the second decile
seeing their income jump by 5.3%, and those in the top 80% seeing a drop in
income); Jonathan Cohn, Republicans Are Right: Obamacare is Redistribution,
NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115875/
obamacare-redistribution-not-how-republicans-say [http://perma.cc/9QBMTU7C] (reporting that the “majority of funding in the law is money paid by—or
given up by—either the wealthy or parts of the health care industry”); James
Oliphant, Love It or Hate It, Obamacare Redistributes Americans’ Wealth, NAT’L J.
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/health-care/love-it-or-hate-itobamacare-redistributes-americans-wealth-20131121 [http://perma.cc/3VEA6KVB] (discussing redistributive effects of the Affordable Care Act).
130
See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Daniel A. Crane, Patent Punting: How
FDA and Antitrust Courts Undermine the Hatch-Waxman Act to Avoid Dealing with
Patents, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 197, 229–37 (2015) (explaining the
concept of “reverse payment” and summarizing the response of antitrust courts).
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Together, general government final consumption and
health care constitute approximately a quarter of the entire
economy. To the extent that those systems act as progressive
wealth redistribution vehicles, exercises of market power in
those segments reduce the wealth of the wealthy proportionately more than the wealth of the poor and may thus reduce
wealth inequality.
b. Intercorporate Effects
A second significant factor determining whether household
purchasers bear the brunt of monopoly rents concerns the
space between the household purchaser and the antitrust violator in the production and distribution chain. Many antitrust
violations occur in input markets considerably upstream from
end consumers. In such cases, before affecting a consumer’s
pocketbook, an overcharge would need to be passed through a
chain of other companies—intermediate manufacturers, assemblers, wholesalers, retailers, and so forth. Even if household purchasers ended up absorbing a significant share of the
overcharges, the net effect of the overcharge could be to reduce
inequality, depending on the relative wealth of the upstream
business interests.
Proponents of the thesis that exercises of market power
tend to operate directly on household consumers seem to have
in mind circumstances where large corporations violate the
antitrust laws and then sell their products directly to consumers. However, that paradigm is not reflective of many of the
most serious violations of antitrust law. For example, John
Connor and Gustav Helmers’s study of international cartels
found that 62% of all affected sales were in industrial intermediate goods—which would not be purchased directly by consumers—and only 10% of affected sales were in goods
manufactured for consumers.131 In other words, the vast majority of collusive behavior by firms occurs in markets far upstream from household customers. The extent to which
upstream overcharges are passed through to end consumers or
are instead absorbed by upstream firms is a function of elasticities in the distribution chain and a sharply contested issue in
131
John M. Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, Statistics on Modern Private International Cartels, 1990–2005, at 17 (Dep’t of Agric. Econ., Purdue Univ., Working
Paper No. 06-11, 2006), http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/working_papers/work
ingpaper.connor.11.10.06.pdf [http://perma.cc/59UP-SMA6].
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private antitrust litigation and merger analysis.132 Unless the
pass-on rate is one (or greater, as is possible in some instances), some share of monopoly overcharges will not be borne
by consumers but by other producers.
If the intermediary producer is wealthier than the upstream antitrust violator, the amount of overcharge absorbed
by the intermediary could have progressive wealth effects.
Even where the pass-through rate is relatively high and all
producers are wealthier than all consumers, it is possible for a
monopoly overcharge absorbed in part by an intermediate firm
that is substantially wealthier (in terms of households benefited by changes in its wealth) than the upstream antitrust
violator to result in a reduction in the inequality coefficient.
This could occur if the households affected by changes in the
wealth of the upstream firm were closer in wealth to the end
consumers than to the households affected by changes in the
wealth of the intermediary firm.
To illustrate, imagine a family-owned business representing households at the 60th percentile of the wealth distribution
selling inputs to a large corporation representing households at
the 90th percentile of the wealth distribution, which in turn
passes on 70% of the overcharge to consumers representing
household wealth at the 50th percentile and absorbs the remaining 30%. Suppose the upstream firm obtains market
power through an antitrust violation and charges its corporate
customer an inflated price. Every dollar of overcharge redirects
30 cents of income from the 90th percentile to the 60th percentile and 70 cents of income from the 50th percentile to the 60th
percentile. If the magnitude of any transfer of wealth between
two entities is calculated as the product of the difference in
wealth between the two entities and the magnitude of the
transfer, then the net effect of this antitrust violation would be
progressive.133
Exercises of market power have attenuated ripple effects
on the economy. In only a relatively small share of cases does
an overcharge payment flow directly from a consumer to an
antitrust violator without being distributed among various ex132
See Fei Deng et al., Economic Analysis in Indirect Purchaser Class Actions,
26 ANTITRUST 51, 52–53 (2011); Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 76–77 (2010).
133
In effect, this example involves a progressive transfer of 30 cents times .30
(the distance between the antitrust violator and the intermediate firm) and a
regressive transfer of 70 cents times .10 (the distance between the antitrust
violator and the household consumer). Since .9 > .7, the progressive effect is
greater than the regressive effect and the net effect is progressive.
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ploiting or exploited business interests. Differences in wealth
between the positively and negatively affected business interests would need to be taken into account of before establishing
the net wealth redistribution effects of the challenged conduct.
Antitrust violations have significant intercorporate effects.
Those effects significantly complicate any effort to make general pronouncements about the wealth redistribution consequences of antitrust violations or antitrust enforcement.
c. Wealthy and Poor Consumers
Notwithstanding the points emphasized in the previous
two sections, it is clear that household consumers do end up
bearing some of the brunt of antitrust violations. But it is a
long leap from that recognition to the claim that antitrust violations are regressive. The relatively wealthy can be exploited
through the exercise of market power at least as much as—and
perhaps proportionately more than—the relatively poor.
Anticompetitive conduct is by no means limited to markets
involving sales to primarily lower income individuals. One can
readily identify examples of antitrust violations in industries
producing goods or services sold primarily to the wealthy; for
example, gem-quality diamonds,134 stock brokerage services,135 auctioning of high-end art,136 and luxury watches.137
Picking on just one market, anticompetitive actions have a storied history in the luxury automobile industry. Recently, federal prosecutors in New York recommended the indictment for
price fixing of Mercedes-Benz dealers in New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut;138 while Chinese competition officials mulled
bringing price fixing charges against BMW and Audi.139
Reaching back in automotive history, Rolls-Royce secretly ac134

See Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 2011).
See Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 797–98 (2d
Cir. 2002).
136
See Kruman v. Christie’s Int’l PLC, 284 F.3d 384, 390–91 (2d Cir. 2002).
137
See Nicoleta Tuominen & Simon Frankel, Two Polish Distributors of Luxury
Watches Fined for Unlawful Price Fixing, COVINGTON & BURLING LLP: COVBRANDS
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.covbrands.com/2014/02/19/two-polish-distribu
tors-of-luxury-watches-fined-for-unlawful-price-fixing/ [http://perma.cc/Z69RB45M].
138
See Eric Lichtblau & Stephen Labaton, U.S. Will Not Pursue Price-Fixing
Case Against Mercedes Dealers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2003), http://www.nytimes
.com/2003/12/25/business/us-will-not-pursue-price-fixing-case-against-mer
cedes-dealers.html [http://perma.cc/6ZQR-HL8W].
139
See Jeevan Vasagar, Car Makers Face Possible China Probe over PriceFixing Fears, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 13, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/china-business/10240624/Car-makers-face-possible-China-probeover-price-fixing-fears.html [http://perma.cc/J59E-NVGZ].
135
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quired Bentley during the Great Depression, largely to forestall
competition from its closest rival.140 And, to pick a famous
monopolization case, one can ponder the wealth distribution
effects in Aspen, Colorado—playground of the rich and famous—when the Aspen Skiing Company decided to jettison its
cooperation with the rival mountain owned by Highlands.141 In
all of these cases—and many others—the modal customer for
the relevant good or service was likely to be in the upper stratum of the income distribution.142
Looking economy-wide, the effects of increases in market
power on the distribution of wealth are subtle. Consumers in
the top quintile of household wealth spend four times as much
as consumers in the bottom quintile.143 So, if monopolists extracted equal proportions of wealth from every consumer dollar
spent, the burden of monopoly pricing would fall four times as
heavily on the wealthiest income stratum than on the least
wealthy stratum. However, the effect of monopoly pricing could
still be regressive in the sense of increasing the gap in relative
wealth between the rich and the poor. Monopoly rent extraction operates essentially like sales taxes, which are known to
have regressive properties,144 because spending as a share of
income decreases with increases in income (since the rich save
a considerably greater percentage of their income than do the
poor).145 But monopoly pricing probably does not have the
regressive characteristics of a sales tax.
140

1 THE BEAULIEU ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AUTOMOBILE 151 (Nick Georgano ed.,

2000).
141
See George L. Priest & Jonathan Lewinsohn, Aspen Skiing: Product Differentiation and Thwarting Free Ridings as Monopolization, in ANTITRUST STORIES 229,
236–42 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007).
142
Baker and Salop dismiss such cases, saying that they “expect [that these]
situations are rare,” Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 17, but offer no empirical or
theoretical basis for their assumption.
143
See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2013, at 9
tbl.1 (Feb. 2015), http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann13.pdf [http://perma.cc/63LJ4RCA] (reporting annual household expenditures of $22,393 for households in
the bottom income quintile and $99,237 for households in the top quintile).
144
See, e.g., Daniel R. Feenberg et al., Distributional Effects of Adopting a
National Retail Sales Tax, 11 TAX POL’Y AND ECON. 49, 86 (1997) (concluding that
the tax burden on high income households is generally lower under the retail
sales tax than under the income tax because the former’s structure is more
progressive).
145
See Mark Aguiar & Mark Bils, Has Consumption Inequality Mirrored Income
Inequality?, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2725, 2736 (2015); Dirk Krueger & Fabrizio Perri,
Does Income Inequality Lead to Consumption Inequality? Evidence and Theory, 73
REV. ECON. STUD. 163, 186 (2006); Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth
Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax
Data 52 fig.9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20625, 2014)
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First, the regressive effect of sales taxes arises because
unspent wealth is not subject to the tax. In the case of monopoly power, however, there is no reason to exclude unspent
wealth from the rent-extraction capacity of monopolists. Rents
can be extracted from unspent wealth due to monopolistic conditions in the banking, brokerage, investment products, and
financial services industries. Indeed, anticompetitive conditions in the banking and financial services industries are
among the chief complaints of progressives today.146 If the
general level of monopolistic rent extraction on unspent wealth
is equal to the level of monopolistic rent extraction on consumer spending, then the regressivity of the sales tax would
vanish altogether for monopoly rent extraction.147
Second, the regressivity of the sales tax arises from the
tax’s flat rate, but monopolists do not extract equal proportions
of wealth from rich and poor consumers for every dollar spent.
To the contrary, economic theory holds that market power permits monopolists to price discriminate and do so primarily to
the disadvantage of the wealthy. Acts that create market power
may thus permit the selling firm to charge different prices to
different classes of consumers based on their varying demand
elasticities and to do so in progressive ways.
Price discrimination through the exercise of market power
is a pervasive concern of modern antitrust policy.148 For example, the Justice Department and FTC’s 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines repeatedly stress the concern that market power
acquired through mergers will facilitate price discrimina(reporting savings rate of around 35–40% for the top 1% of households and
around 0% for the bottom 90% in the 2010–12 period).
146
See Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 797–98 (2d
Cir. 2002) (reporting allegations concerning collusion in stock brokerage services);
Examining the Market Power and Impact of Proxy Advisory Firms: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 113th Cong. 10–11 (2013) (statement of Niels Holch, Executive Director,
Shareholder Communications Coalition); STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note
3, at 46–47 (complaining of anticompetitive consolidation in banking industry).
147
It also does not necessarily follow that rent extraction through the financial
system would be regressive because the gains would be disproportionately captured by large financial services corporations. As discussed in Part I.C.1, the
gains from monopoly profits may be widely shared within, and outside, the corporation. For example, in a cartel of stockbrokers, the stockbroker beneficiaries,
with a median annual income of $72,070, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Securities, Commodities, and Financial Services Sales Agents, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/sales/securities-commodities-andfinancial-services-sales-agents.htm [http://perma.cc/7AMP-3Y7P], might be well
below their median client in the income distribution.
148
See generally 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 517, at 151–53
(3d ed. 2007) (outlining the significance of price discrimination).
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tion.149 Whether or not price discrimination is economically
efficient,150 it usually has progressive wealth effects, since the
wealthy are less price elastic than the poor for most goods and
services.151 As firms acquire market power through anticompetitive acts and begin to increase their prices, they often do so
employing pricing schemes that extract significantly more monopolistic rents from the wealthy than from the poor. To the
extent that antitrust enforcement creates more competitive
markets and more competitive markets diminish price discrimination, the effect in many instances could be to decrease the
prices paid by the rich while reducing less, keeping flat, or even
decreasing the prices paid by the comparatively less wealthy.
3. Magnitude and Computability of the Crosscutting
Effects
The analysis presented thus far shows that monopoly pricing has complex crosscutting effects, some progressive and
some regressive, on the distribution of wealth. In some ways,
149
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
6–7 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [http:/
/perma.cc/UR85-QZCN] (describing federal antitrust agencies’ concerns about
market power created by horizontal mergers leading to price discrimination).
150
Compare BORK, supra note 58, at 398 (suggesting that price discrimination
is either neutral or positive for output), with Brief of Professor F.M. Scherer as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 17, Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 28 (No.
04-1329), 2005 WL 2427642, at *17 (contending that price discrimination reduces output and decreases overall consumer welfare), and Brief of Professors Barry Nalebuff, Ian Ayres, & Lawrence Sullivan as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 17–18, Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
(No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 2427646, at *17–18 (arguing that while the “predominant
explanation” for tying requirements is price discrimination via metering, such
metering will usually lead to reductions in consumer welfare and is inefficient).
151
See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 139 (1988) (“Of
course, raising monopoly profits at the expense of consumers may not be very
desirable. On the other hand, the low-elasticity groups are often (but not always)
the richer consumers.”); William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential
Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 25 (2007) (“[P]rice discrimination often,
though not invariably, results in a progressive redistribution of wealth.”); Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1733 (2008) (“While price discrimination necessarily shifts surplus away from consumers, it also enables poor consumers who
would otherwise be unable to afford a product the opportunity to obtain it at a
reduced price. For that reason, price discrimination often entails a progressive redistribution of resources.”); Rory Van Loo, Helping Buyers Beware: The Need for
Supervision of Big Retail, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1358 (2015) (“Even if lowincome consumers currently pay about the same as high-income consumers for
goods, anticompetitive practices could still have distributional implications. It is
likely, for example, that some anticompetitive pricing practices are progressive because they enable price discrimination in accordance with ability to pay. For
example, because low-income families are more price sensitive, they have greater
motivation to spend time collecting and analyzing product information.”).

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

1208

unknown

Seq: 38

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-JUN-16

15:42

[Vol. 101:1171

exercises of market power increase wealth inequality, but in
other ways such exercises create greater equality. In order to
draw any firm conclusions regarding the net effect on wealth
distribution of market power exercises and antitrust enforcement, one would need to prove the relative magnitudes of the
crosscutting effects. That is a task that, to my knowledge, has
never been undertaken and could not likely be done with anything approaching statistical rigor.
Part of the difficulty in calculating a net effect on progressivity or regressivity arises from the dynamic interaction between various crosscutting factors. For example, simultaneous
increases in the marginal income tax rate and in antitrust enforcement in the defense industry could have offsetting effects
on the distribution of income, with the tax increase extracting
proportionately more income from the wealthy and the antitrust enforcement in effect rebating some of those tax increases
back to those same wealthy taxpayers.152 Laxity in merger
policy could initially enrich shareholders and senior managers
but eventually make it easier for unions to organize against the
monopoly employers and to extract a significant share of the
rents for the benefit of blue-collar workers.153 Antitrust enforcement that dissuaded manufacturers from restricting the
resale freedom of their distributors might initially transfer economic power from large upstream firms to smaller downstream
firms but eventually incentivize the manufacturers to integrate
forward into distribution, eliminating smaller, independent distributors altogether.154 Even if a particular instance of antitrust enforcement would appear to have progressive wealth
redistribution effects in the short run, its hydraulic pressures
on the economy and interaction with other crosscutting effects
could cause offsetting regressive effects.155

152

See infra text accompanying note 234.
See supra text accompanying notes 78–89.
154
See Robert C. Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 BUS. LAW. 669, 686 (1968)
(reporting that Arnold, Schwinn & Co. integrated forward into retail distribution
after the Supreme Court declared nonprice territorial restrictions per se unlawful); Earl E. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 NW. U. L.
REV. 595, 609–10 (1968) (discussing the tendency of manufacturers to integrate
forward into distribution once their options to control distribution through contract are curtailed by the antitrust laws).
155
See generally R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 31 (1956–57) (“It is of the nature of the economic process, therefore, that optimisation takes place at successive levels, and
that the maximisation of a welfare function subject to a transformation function is
only the topmost of these.”).
153

R
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A further complication relates to the political effects of
changes in the levels of market power and market concentration. Work in economics and political science suggests that the
political demand for higher tax rates increases as market concentration increases.156 If so, systematic enforcement of the
antitrust laws to ensure competitive markets could, over time,
translate into lower electoral demand for progressive income
taxation and eventually translate into a reduction in marginal
rates and lower incidences of redistribution through governmental taxation and spending. That, in turn, could have very
significant regressive effects, since progressive taxation and income redistribution have much more direct progressive effects
than antitrust enforcement has (if any).
In sum, the trust-busting prescription to cure wealth inequality is highly speculative, at best. Economy-wide, the
wealth distribution effects of anticompetitive conduct and
remediation through antitrust enforcement are too ambiguous,
attenuated, and dynamically interactive to permit the sort of
broad claims commonly advanced in the monopoly regressivity
thesis.
II
HOW ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT SOMETIMES IMPEDES
PRIVATE EFFORTS TO ADVANCE EQUALITY
A. The Arc of Competition Does Not Bend Toward Equality
There is something odd in the monopoly regressivity claim
that lax antitrust enforcement contributes to wealth inequality.
The critique implicitly assumes that more market competition—the virtue that antitrust law is supposed to produce—
means more equality.157 But that assumption cannot be
squared with a plethora of redistributive social welfare programs, which are predicated on the assumption that when income is based solely on the value of the participants’ marginal
contributions to impersonal markets, gross income inequality
results. For example, if competition achieved a desirable income distribution, then minimum wage laws would be unnecessary. Those laws are necessary because the interaction
between downstream product market competition and upstream competition for labor inputs results in wages that are
156
See Margarita Katsimi & Thomas Moutos, Monopoly, Inequality and Redistribution via the Public Provision of Private Goods 2–4 (CESifo, Working Paper No.
1318, 2004), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=619061
[http://perma.cc/LR9R-QT93].
157
See STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 3, at 53–59.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

1210

unknown

Seq: 40

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-JUN-16

15:42

[Vol. 101:1171

deemed socially unacceptable.158 Organizing unions had to be
exempted from the antitrust laws because requiring competition for employment among the laboring classes would result in
lower income and poorer working conditions.159 The entire social welfare state is predicated on redirecting the paths of markets from the outcomes otherwise determined by competitive
exchange.
The arc of competition does not inherently bend toward
equality. To the contrary, competition tends to concentrate
wealth in the hands of those with the resources valued most by
the market. To the extent that resources are unevenly distributed—think of intelligence, skill, family upbringing, and educational opportunity—competition often exacerbates inequality
as compared to systems that allocate wealth based on some
principle of equal desert. As previously noted, for example,
increased product market competition tends to lead to wage
increases for skilled workers and wage reductions for unskilled
workers.160 Similarly, unregulated markets for executive talent lead to high wages for corporate managers based on competitive benchmarking.161 Further, increases in product
market competition might lead to an increase in CEO compensation since managerial talent might be most valuable to corporations when product market competition intensifies.162 In
sum, competition tends to distribute wealth unevenly and regulatory intervention is often required to alter these inequality
effects.

158
See Bruce E. Kaufman, Institutional Economics and the Minimum Wage:
Broadening the Theoretical and Policy Debate, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 427, 432
(2010) (discussing conventional economic assumptions about the relationship
between competitive labor markets and competitive product markets).
159
See Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1379, 1396–97 (1988) (discussing the legislative history of the antitrust labor
exemption and Congress’s intention to raise wages of working classes by permitting immunity from antitrust law for noncompetitive agreements).
160
See supra text accompanying note 85.
161
See Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer
Groups, and Overcompensation: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CORP. L. 487,
493 (2013) (describing the prevailing approach of setting executive compensation
based on competitive benchmarking of peer groups).
162
Hae Won Jung & Ajay Subramanian, CEO Talent, CEO Compensation, and
Product Market Competition 31–36 (Fin. Res. Network Res. Paper Series, 2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187062 [http://perma
.cc/JC7V-VNSG] (reporting that CEO compensation is quantitatively in line with
CEO contributions to their firms and the degree of market competition affects
CEO value to the firm and hence CEO compensation).
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B. Private Efforts to Redress Competition’s Bent Toward
Inequality
Government welfare programs are not the only forces to
counteract the regressive wealth distribution effects of market
competition. Private firms, both for-profit and nonprofit, sometimes seek to mitigate the unequal outcomes of markets by
restricting competition. In such cases, antitrust law poses an
obstacle to the private actors’ redistributive efforts. In considering the effects of a greater or lesser degree of antitrust enforcement on the distribution of wealth, it is necessary to take
into account the ways in which antitrust law may frustrate the
efforts of private actors to achieve a more just distribution of
wealth through voluntary, if perhaps anticompetitive,
arrangements.
The wealth redistribution issue is a subset of a larger question concerning the role of antitrust law in policing potentially
anticompetitive action undertaken to address identified social
evils or to generate public goods. As discussed in greater detail
in Part III.B, the courts have not yet developed robust principles for addressing such questions. In order to set the stage for
consideration of circumstances where antitrust enforcement
frustrates private efforts to reduce wealth inequality, here are
some exemplars of private organizations adopting or considering adopting anticompetitive restrictions for generally (and arguably) altruistic or ethical purposes:
• In 2014, the American Institute of Architects (AIA) considered the promulgation of ethical rules prohibiting its members from designing torture chambers, such as those
alleged to exist at the U.S. military facilities at Guantanamo Bay.163 In declining to adopt such rules, the AIA
cited antitrust prohibitions, apparently concerned that its
rule could be considered an illegal group boycott.164
• In 1983, a group of trial lawyers representing indigent
criminal defendants in the Washington, D.C. court system
collectively agreed to boycott any new representations until
the Superior Court increased their hourly compensation.165 The lawyers argued that their boycott was intended to increase the quality of criminal representation
163
See Raphael Sperry, Opinion, Architects and Torture: What Color is Your
Waterboard?, CNN (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/23/
opinion/sperry-architects-torture/ [http://perma.cc/6F4U-RUKS].
164
See id.
165
Donald I. Baker, The Superior Court Trial Lawyers Case–A Battle on the
Frontier Between Politics and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 141, at
257.
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and hence to protect constitutional values.166 Though
casting doubt on the wisdom of a Federal Trade Commission enforcement action against the trial lawyers, the Supreme Court nonetheless held the arrangement a per se
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.167
• In 1964, the tobacco industry adopted a Cigarette Advertising and Promotion Code prohibiting many varieties of minor-targeted advertising and prohibiting cigarette
companies from making representations about the healthfulness of cigarettes in their advertising.168 In June of
1964, “[t]he Justice Department . . . departed from its set
policy of refusing to allow trade associations or other
groups of businessmen to enforce their own codes to promote good behavior”169 and provisionally approved the
Code on the grounds of the social desirability of reducing
tobacco consumption.170
• In 1975, the three major television networks adopted a
Family Viewing Policy aimed at curtailing children’s exposure to programming containing violence, sex, or offensive
language during the first two hours of network prime time
programming.171 The networks abandoned the policy after
an antitrust lawsuit by the Justice Department against the
National Association of Broadcasters.172

In each of these cases, one might take the circumscribed
view that the relevant restriction should not have raised an
antitrust objection because the act was unlikely to create market power. Or, one might take the more general view that antitrust law’s prohibition should not give way simply because of a
166

See id.
See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990).
168
TOBACCO INST., CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND PROMOTION CODE 3 (Dec. 1990),
https://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/#id=hnhl01370
[http://perma.cc/5UHB-HXDQ].
169
Antitrust: Justice Clears Penalty Provision in Proposed Code for Cigarette
Advertising, BUS. POL’YS, June 22, 1964, at A10.
170
See Cigaret Ad Code Gets Antitrust Immunization from Justice Agency, WALL
ST. J., June 23, 1964, at 3.
171
See Writers Guild of Am., W., Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1072 (C.D.
Cal. 1976), vacated, Writers Guild of Am, W., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Co., 609 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1979).
172
See Angela J. Campbell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J.
711, 734 (1999). A similar issue arose when William Paley, the founder and
longtime chairman of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), proposed that
the three major television networks consider jointly setting aside two hours a
week at staggered times for quality cultural programming. ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 247
(5th ed. 2003) (citing WILLIAM S. PALEY, AS IT HAPPENED 275–76 (1979)). NBC and
ABC apparently were not interested in the proposal. See id; PHILLIP AREEDA, THE
“RULE OF REASON” IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: GENERAL ISSUES 4 (1981) (explaining the
anticompetitive effects of such an arrangement).
167
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purportedly altruistic motive.173 For present purposes, the important observation is positive—antitrust law, with its singular
purpose of bolstering market competition and consumer
choice, sometimes conflicts with private efforts to achieve ideological or social objectives that require subverting market
forces.
In an important subset of these cases, the object of the
anticompetitive restriction is to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth or opportunity than the market would otherwise obtain under demand-driven conditions. These cases are
thus important to the thesis critiqued in this Article—that antitrust enforcement progressively redistributes wealth—because
they demonstrate just the opposite effect. Where private organizations seek to alter the usual play of supply and demand in
order to achieve greater equality, aggressive enforcement of antitrust law could have regressive effects. Any account of antitrust law’s progressivity must take into account these effects.
The following Part considers three examples of private regulatory activity designed to achieve a more progressive wealth
distribution than the market would otherwise produce under
the shadow of antitrust law.
C. Three Examples
1. College Financial Aid
In 1958, eight Ivy League schools and MIT (the Ivies) embarked on a collaborative scheme to allocate scarce financial
aid resources to students based on need rather than merit.174
The schools formed an “Ivy Overlap Group” that involved financial aid personnel from the nine schools collectively determining the financial need profile of all commonly admitted
students.175 The schools agreed that they would provide financial aid based on need only—merit-based aid was
prohibited.176
In 1991, the Justice Department brought an antitrust lawsuit against the Overlap program, characterizing it as a form of
price fixing for tuition.177 The eight Ivy League schools immedi173
See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“[A]
good intention will [not] save an otherwise objectionable regulation . . . .”).
174
See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1993). The Ivy
League schools implicated were Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell
University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale University. See id. at 662 n.1.
175
Id. at 662.
176
See id.
177
See id. at 661.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-5\CRN503.txt

1214

unknown

Seq: 44

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

30-JUN-16

15:42

[Vol. 101:1171

ately entered into a consent decree agreeing to abandon the
Overlap program.178 MIT soldiered on alone, ultimately winning an appellate decision that required a full rule of reason
determination of the purposes and effects of the overlap system.179 On remand, having established an important precedent with little immediate practical importance since the other
Ivies had withdrawn, MIT also settled on terms preventing the
Overlap program from continuing in the future.180
Important to the court of appeals’ decision was MIT’s “alleged pure altruistic motive and alleged absence of a revenue
maximizing purpose.”181 MIT justified the program as enhancing educational opportunities for economically disadvantaged
and minority students.182 Financial aid competition for students with the highest grades and test scores inevitably resulted in scarce financial aid resources being allocated to
wealthy students who did not need the money to attend college.
By agreeing to match financial aid to need and compete on
nonprice factors such as educational quality and fit, the
schools could make an elite college education affordable for a
wider socioeconomic group.183
The abandonment of the Overlap program arguably had
regressive effects on admissions to elite higher education programs. According to the president of Yale University, the Overlap program “served the good social purposes of making sure
that a limited amount of financial funds went to the neediest
students.”184 MIT argued that the Overlap program had dramatically increased the percentage of minority enrollment in its
student body in the three decades it was in place.185 Over a
decade after the Overlap program ended, the student bodies at
Ivy League schools remain overwhelmingly drawn from wealthy
178

See id. at 662 n.1.
See id. at 679.
180
See Elizabeth T. Bangs, MIT Settlement Won’t Save Overlap, HARV. CRIMSON
(June 9, 1994), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/1994/6/9/mit-settlementwont-save-overlap-pdid/ [http://perma.cc/3T8J-W4WV] (reporting that MIT settlement “might have effectively killed any possibility for true exchange of
information”).
181
Brown, 5 F.3d at 672.
182
See id. at 675.
183
See id. at 664.
184
Anthony DePalma, Ivy Universities Deny Price-Fixing but Agree to Avoid It in
the Future, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/
us/ivy-universities-deny-price-fixing-but-agree-to-avoid-it-in-the-future.html
[http://perma.cc/2NAU-QJ8J].
185
See Brown, 5 F.3d at 675 (“[T]he percentage of American minorities comprising MIT’s student body has dramatically risen over the last three decades, which MIT attributes to the Overlap policy . . . .”).
179
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families.186 Antitrust enforcement against the Ivies is surely
not the only cause of this inequality but it may have contributed to it.
2. College Athletics
The second example involves the NCAA’s rule prohibiting
member institutions from compensating their student-athletes, which has the practical effect of keeping NCAA member
schools from providing lucrative compensation to a handful of
men’s football and basketball players. A currently pending antitrust class action lawsuit filed by a high-profile sports labor
attorney, Jeffrey Kessler, alleges that the NCAA rule amounts
to price fixing.187 Under current NCAA rules, member schools
may grant athletic scholarships and cover various student expenses such as room, board, housing, health insurance, and
athletic clothing but may not pay their student-athletes compensation for services rendered.188 According to Kessler, “[t]he
main objective is to strike down permanently the restrictions
that prevent athletes in Division I basketball and the top tier of
college football from being fairly compensated for the billions of
dollars in revenues that they help generate.”189 In other words,
NCAA Division I football and basketball players would become
school employees compensated for their labor at market-determined rates.
If successful, this lawsuit would likely exacerbate various
inequalities due to the role that high revenue–generating sports
currently play in subsidizing other educational activities.190
186
See David Leonhardt, How Elite Colleges Still Aren’t Diverse, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX (Mar. 29, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/
03/29/how-elite-colleges-still-arent-diverse/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/J64YSQD5] (analyzing Chronicle of Higher Education data and concluding that only a
small share of students at elite colleges come from low-income families); David
Zax, Wanted: Smart Students from Poor Families, YALE ALUMNI MAG. (Jan./Feb.
2014), http://yalealumnimagazine.com/articles/3801 [http://perma.cc/63A2DQKZ] (reporting that two-thirds of Yale’s undergraduate population was drawn
from households in the top quintile of household wealth).
187
Farrey, supra note 12. In a related case challenging the NCAA’s rules that
prohibit student athletes from being compensated for the commercial use of their
names, images, and likenesses, the Northern District of California issued an
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing its rule beyond a cap of $5,000
per student per year. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal.
2014), aff’d in part & vacated in part, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015).
188
See Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/
scholarships [http://perma.cc/H73W-CMK7].
189
Farrey, supra note 12.
190
The lawsuit would also exacerbate inequality by making millionaires out of
a small group of male college basketball and football players.
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Most universities have made their athletic departments financially independent from the rest of the university, allowing
them to keep their own revenues and reinvest them in athletic
programs.191 The high commercial value sports—particularly
football and basketball—generate far more income than they
cost (in large part because they rely on free labor). For example, according to the Department of Education’s data, in 2013
the top twenty-five football programs had expenses of $561
million and revenues over $1.2 billion.192 The effect has been
the massive subsidization of athletic programs with less commercial market appeal but that still afford important educational opportunities. In particular, the NCAA system has
enabled athletic departments to make significant investments
in women’s athletic programs, some of which are quite expensive to run but have little commercial value.193 If the antitrust
challenge is successful and NCAA schools are forced to pay
their football and basketball athletes market wages, there will
be considerably less income available to subsidize less popular
sports, especially women’s sports.194
The gender equality implications of reducing the funding
for women’s collegiate athletics could be felt well beyond college
playing fields. Empirical research by Betsey Stevenson has
191
See RANDY R. GRANT, JOHN LEADLEY & ZENON ZYGMONT, THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 253 (2008).
192
Alicia Jessop, The Economics of College Football: A Look at the Top-25
Teams’ Revenues And Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football-alook-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/ [http://perma.cc/UF8CB6NU].
193
See GRANT, LEADLEY & ZYGMONT, supra note 191, at 295–97 (examining large
amount of cross-subsidization of less popular sports from football and basketball
programs); ALAN MARZILLI, AMATEUR ATHLETICS 27 (2004) (same); Matthew Mitten &
Stephen F. Ross, Regulate, Don’t Litigate, Change in College Sports, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (June 10, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2014/06/10/college-sports-would-be-better-reformed-through-federal-regulation-lawsuits-essay
[http://perma.cc/Y77E-AUJ9] (“[N]onprofit universities use excess revenues generated by commercially successful football and men’s basketball programs to
cross-subsidize women’s and men’s non-revenue sports rather than distributing
these ‘profits’ to owners or investors as professional leagues and clubs do.”).
194
A complicating factor is Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,
which requires that educational programs receiving federal assistance provide
equal opportunities regardless of sex. Title IX has been interpreted to require
equal funding of men’s and women’s sports, a result that would be difficult to
sustain if male football and basketball players were paid market rates. However,
if male football and basketball athletes were declared employees rather than
students, football and basketball might be removed from the denominator for Title
IX purposes. See Doug Lederman, College Sports’ Antitrust Vulnerability, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/16/
sports-antitrust-lawyers-latest-target-ncaa-scholarship-limits#sthash.kdVCfD55.dpbs [http://perma.cc/2CZY-9T6L].
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shown that a 10% increase in female sports participation in
high school generates a 0.8% increase in the probability that a
female attends four years of college and a 1.9% increase in the
probability that a female will be employed.195 She also found
that this same 10% increase in opportunities to play sports
resulted in greater female participation in traditionally maledominated occupations, particularly in high-skill professions.196 If similar effects result from investments in collegiate
women’s athletics, a collateral consequence of successful antitrust enforcement against the NCAA could be to diminish women’s achievements in the workplace.
3. Sweatshops in the Global Supply Chain
A final example of antitrust law potentially frustrating private efforts to secure a more just distribution of wealth arises
in the U.S. garment industry. For years, U.S. companies, particularly in the garment and apparel industry, have come
under pressure from various constituencies to take responsibility for poor and unsafe working conditions in their global
supply chains.197 This pressure intensified after the tragic
Rana Plaza building collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh on April
24, 2013.198
Many U.S. garment manufacturers and retailers have expressed a willingness to pressure their global suppliers to ensure safe and decent working conditions and living wages.199
They are finding, however, that individual company efforts are
largely ineffective at improving working conditions. Suppliers
would be much more likely to respond to joint pressure by a
critical mass of their U.S. customers.200 That, however, raises
195
Betsey Stevenson, Beyond the Classroom: Using Title IX to Measure the
Return to High School Sports 15–16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15728, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15728.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/ARF2-U5DH].
196
Id. at 18–19.
197
See Crane & Kobren, supra note 11.
198
See Suzanne Kapner, Biman Mukherji & Shelly Banjo, Before Dhaka Collapse, Some Firms Fled Risk, WALL ST. J. (May 8, 2013, 4:12 AM), http://www.wsj
.com/articles/SB10001424127887324766604578458802423873488 [http://
perma.cc/837B-BRRC].
199
See Tierney Sneed, Why Cleaning Up the Fashion Industry Is So Messy,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (July 16, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.usnews.com/
news/articles/2014/07/16/efforts-to-clean-up-fast-fashion-supply-chains-facea-tough-road [http://perma.cc/3MKK-56NL]; Laura D’Andrea Tyson, The Challenges of Running Responsible Supply Chains, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Feb. 7, 2014,
12:01 AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/07/the-challenges-ofrunning-responsible-supply-chains/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LF48-ULM2].
200
See Crane & Kobren, supra note 11.
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antitrust issues, since joint efforts by competitive companies to
fix their suppliers’ labor standards might well be considered a
group boycott or price fixing under the operation of antitrust
principles.201 A number of U.S. executives have privately reported antitrust concerns about banding together with their
peers to assert serious leverage over labor conditions in global
supply chains.202
Thus far, the Justice Department has struck a cautious
tone about the antitrust implications of business undertakings
to improve labor conditions overseas. In 2011, the Antitrust
Division responded to a business review letter request by a law
firm representing the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), a nonprofit corporation formed “to promote socially responsible initiatives by universities and colleges . . . for the improvement of
working conditions and labor standards.”203 The WRC seeks to
improve wages and working conditions in the supply chain of
garment manufacturers licensed by its member schools by
specifying a code of fair labor practices and then certifying
compliance by individual producers.204 The Justice Department cautiously blessed this arrangement, albeit by stressing
its limited scope. It noted that “[i]ncorporation of the Proposed
Licensing Terms is optional and up to each school and licensee” and that “the factories affected by the Proposed Licensing
Terms are likely to constitute only a tiny portion of the labor
market, making significant anticompetitive effects in that market unlikely.”205 Its analysis and enforcement intentions might
well be different if a similar agreement were undertaken by forprofit horizontal competitors that have a large market share in
the U.S. output market and that purchase a similarly significant share of the upstream labor inputs.
The sweatshop example shows how the operation of conventional antitrust principles can have regressive wealth distribution effects, including in the United States. Much of the
political pressure on U.S. companies to improve global supply
chain labor conditions comes from U.S. labor unions, which
believe that poor wages abroad create unfair competitive pres201

See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1510, at 416–27 (1986).
See Crane & Kobren, supra note 11.
203
Letter from Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Antitrust Div., to Donald I. Baker, Baker & Miller PLLC (Dec. 16, 2011)
(quoting BYLAWS OF THE WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM § 1.2(1) (Apr. 30, 2010)), http:/
/workersrights.org/about/wrc_bylaws.pdf), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
busreview/278342.htm [http://perma.cc/T7PP-B344].
204
See id.
205
Id.
202
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sures that erode wages in the United States.206 For U.S. labor
unions to be able to mount effective pressure on U.S. companies to flex collect muscle to increase wages in their global
supply chains, the ordinary operation of antitrust law would
need to be suspended.
****
These three examples illustrate the broader point that simply honoring the sum of individual preferences otherwise
known as the market often creates or exacerbates inequalities.
Antitrust law insists on the primacy of the consumer and
pushes markets to maximize the consumer’s preferences.207
When private organizations push back on the market’s consumer-centric tendencies for altruistic purposes, they sometimes run afoul of the antitrust laws. Any comprehensive
analysis of antitrust law’s wealth distribution properties must
take these effects into account.
III
RECALIBRATING ANTITRUST TO ADVANCE INCOME EQUALITY
Thus far, this Article has analyzed only the positive claims
that the tendency of antitrust enforcement is to increase wealth
equality and that lax antitrust enforcement is partially responsible for the current state of wealth inequality in the United
States. As shown, the monopoly regressivity claim is unsustainable at that broad level of generality. This final Part considers a potential refinement in the monopoly regressivity claim.
Rather than claiming that antitrust law is generally progressive
in its wealth redistribution effects, one might claim that antitrust law could be progressive if it were properly calibrated to
take distributive effects into account.
This refined monopoly regressivity claim makes some improvement on the broad claim debunked above but it is still
largely misguided. No general adjustment to antitrust doctrine
or practice could reliably improve the Gini index or otherwise
206
See, e.g., BRIAN FINNEGAN, AFL-CIO, RESPONSIBILITY OUTSOURCED: SOCIAL AUDITS, WORKPLACE CERTIFICATION AND TWENTY YEARS OF FAILURE TO PROTECT WORKER
RIGHTS 3-6 (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/77061/

1902391/CSReport.pdf [http://perma.cc/K6PZ-LXFA] (discussing unions’ efforts
to improve conditions in the global supply chain).
207
See generally John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal
of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191, 192 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate purpose of the antitrust laws is to provide
the benefits of competition to consumers—lower prices, better products, and
more choice . . . .”).
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promote a more equal distribution of wealth. To the extent that
wealth equality considerations could reliably enter antitrust
analysis at all, they could only do so modestly, perhaps
through the occasional exercise of prosecutorial discretion and
doctrinal developments accommodating bona fide private efforts to help economically disadvantaged populations.
A. Limitations to Addressing Income Inequality Through
Antitrust
1. Is a Narrower Version of the Monopoly Regressivity
Claim Sustainable?
One potential response to the central thrust of this Article—that the overall effects of antitrust law on the distribution
of wealth are too complexly crosscutting to sustain a general
claim about progressivity—would be to narrow the scope of the
monopoly regressivity claim. Admitting that antitrust law’s
overall effects are distributively indeterminate, one might nonetheless argue that certain types or instances of antitrust enforcement—perhaps horizontal merger policy or cartel
enforcement against banks—have progressive wealth distribution effects and should therefore be pursued with greater vigor.
Without categorically rejecting the idea that selective adjustments to antitrust law (as opposed to a general increase in
enforcement levels) could have progressive distributive effects,
one should be skeptical of any broad claim that more of any
particular type of antitrust enforcement will redound to the
benefit of the comparatively poor. For instance, one might concede that enforcement against noncorporate entities has ambiguous or even regressive distributive effects and therefore
insist that any increase in enforcement be levied solely against
corporations. But such a proposal would not establish the
progressivity of enhanced enforcement because, among other
things, it would still rest on the questionable assumption that
shareholders capture the majority of monopoly rents extracted
by corporations;208 disregard the labor wage premium,209 the
progressive effects of government purchasing, and the thirdparty payer health care system;210 and ignore the interference
of antitrust law with private efforts to redistribute wealth, including by corporate actors.211
208
209
210
211
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When proponents of the monopoly regressivity claim go
beyond the general claim that enhanced antitrust enforcement
would have progressive effects and attempt to articulate specific policy interventions that would advance progressivity, they
mostly fall back on unsustainable generalizations about the
relationship between market power and the distribution of
wealth. In particular, Baker and Salop propose “a number of
specific antitrust and competition policy approaches and adjustments in legal standards that might be considered by policy
makers in response to increasing public concern with inequality.”212 Most of these rest on the assumption that the general
effect of consumer-oriented antitrust enforcement is to advance wealth equality and therefore founder for the reasons
explored in the previous two sections. Their proposals to reject
arguments for abandoning the consumer welfare standard in
favor of an economic efficiency standard213 and to adopt a European-style excessive pricing offense214 continue to assume
that antitrust law reflects, in essence, a tug-of-war between
relatively poorer consumers and richer shareholders.215 For
the reasons explained earlier,216 that assumption is unsustainable. Their proposals to increase the budgets of the antitrust
agencies217 and to become “more interventionist” in antitrust
enforcement218 also assume that a higher level of unspecified
antitrust enforcement yields more progressive wealth distribution. Perhaps their proposal to design antitrust remedies to
benefit less advantaged consumers219 could produce progressive income distribution effects in some cases, but it is hard to
see how such an approach could yield a significant effect on
wealth distribution in the economy at large. Such an approach
would only be available in cases of public enforcement (which
amount to a small share of all antitrust enforcement),220 need
to involve conduct rather than structural remedies (which are
much more common),221 require identifiable differentiated ef212

Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 14.
See id. at 15–18.
214
See id. at 22–24.
215
See id. at 16 (“The consumer welfare standard also helps address inequality because it does not permit conduct that would harm consumers while benefiting shareholders.”).
216
Supra text accompanying notes 56–58.
217
Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 18.
218
Id. at 21.
219
See id. at 20.
220
See Crane, supra note 42, at 1179 (explaining that there are ten private
antitrust cases filed for every public case).
221
Until recently, the antitrust agencies disfavored conduct remedies, favoring structural remedies instead. Response of the U.S. to the Amicus Brief of Ctr.
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fects on poor and wealthy consumers, and require a workable
regulatory remedy capable of protecting poor consumers from
market power exploitation. Further, if remedies to prevent the
exploitation of the poor were available, it is hard to see why
similar remedies to prevent the exploitation of the rich would
not also be available and, if available, deployed.
A recent paper by Einer Elhauge offers another policy prescription for enhanced antitrust enforcement to advance income equality,222 but it too has a limited scope of application.
Drawing on recent work by José Azar, Martin Schmalz, and
Isabel Tecu,223 Elhauge argues that a small number of institutional investors have acquired large minority horizontal shareholding positions in a large number of U.S. industries.224
Elhauge argues that this horizontal shareholding reduces the
incentives of the shareholders to push for increased competition within the industries in which they own shares of multiple
competing producers.225 This, in turn, causes an economywide output reduction that leads to inequality by creating unemployment, reducing the purchasing power of wages, and depressing worker salaries due to monopsony power by
employers.226
Much of Elhauge’s regressivity account is predicated on
the claim that the exercise of monopoly power reduces
wages227—which is inconsistent with the empirical evidence of
for a Competitive Waste Indus. at 3–4, United States v. Republic Servs., Inc., No.
1:08-cv-02076 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/
f253000/253695.htm [http://perma.cc/E8LA-SFMY] (asserting that “[s]tructural
relief is the preferred remedy in all merger cases” and conduct remedies are
“disfavored”). More recently, the agencies have acknowledged a “slight shift” in
their policy towards a more favorable view of behavioral remedies, even though
they still “generally prefer structural solutions.” Christine A. Varney, Assistant
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Oversight of the Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws 3 (June 9, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/259522.htm [http://perma.cc/5L9N-6L43].
222
Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1291–01.
223
José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-competitive Effects of
Common Ownership (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1235, 2015), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2427345 [http://perma.cc/F8
TW-BPRL].
224
Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1267–69.
225
Id. at 1274; see also Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive
Effects of Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559 app. at 610–14 (2000) (creating economic models to predict anticompetitive effects from market concentration indexes modified to account for
partial ownership overlaps among horizontal rivals).
226
See Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1292–93.
227
Id. at 1293 (asserting that anticompetitive markets increase inequality
because the rise in product prices lowers the returns to labor and “anticompetitive
conduct increases returns to capital relative to returns to labor”).
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a monopoly labor wage premium.228 But, in any event, even if
the thrust of Elhauge’s argument about the anticompetitive
effects of horizontal shareholding were correct, it would not
point to a general effect on wealth distribution from increasing
antitrust enforcement. Rather, it would support a particular,
problem-specific antitrust response—taking legal action
against anticompetitive horizontal shareholding.229 His analysis offers no support for the broad monopoly regressivity claim
addressed in this Article.
Broad adjustments in antitrust enforcement, such as increasing the funding of the antitrust agencies or changing antitrust doctrine to make antitrust cases easier to win, are
unlikely to have demonstrable progressive effects on the distribution of wealth. There would be winners and losers up and
down the economy. It remains to be considered whether implementing a case-specific regressivity element as part of the doctrinal fiber of antitrust law would do the trick.
2. Individualized Proof of Regressivity and Comparative
Institutional Advantage
The distributive effects of antitrust enforcement might be
unknowable on an economy-wide basis and yet provable in
individual cases. In that event, the cause of wealth equality
might be advanced by integrating a regressivity element into
antitrust analysis. Baker and Salop propose explicitly adopting income equality as a formal factor in antitrust analysis,
allowing that “[c]onduct might be considered anticompetitive if
it harms middle- and lower-income consumers, even while benefiting wealthier consumers and shareholders.”230
There are many problems with this proposal, starting with
one acknowledged by Baker and Salop—overwhelming complexity.231 Proving the crosscutting wealth effects on senior
managers, midlevel managers, laboring employees, shareholders, vertically related firms, and different classes of consumers
(and all of these same constituencies of other competitively
affected firms) even in a single-market case could easily swamp
already complicated merger or monopolization cases.232
228

See supra text accompanying notes 84–95.
This is, in fact, what Elhauge proposes in the concluding portion of his
article. Elhauge, supra note 7, at 1301–09.
230
Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 24.
231
Id. at 25.
232
See Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on
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Moreover, once regressivity was admitted as a reason to
find the defendant liable, it is hard to see why progressivity
should not be allowed as an affirmative defense to liability. For
example, defendants in a cartel case might argue that the overall effect of their price-fixing regime was to increase worker
wages and segment pricing to consumers in ways that advantaged the lower income distribution. Introducing a regressivity element and hence a countervailing progressivity element
would likely make it more difficult for the government and private plaintiffs to win antitrust cases. The economic complexity
of antitrust law already favors defendants and business interests with the resources to mobilize the best teams of economists and lawyers to produce data and theoretical arguments
advancing their case.233 Increasing the complexity of antitrust
cases by adding a regressivity/progressivity element would
likely be a boon to defendants in many cases.
One might preempt this possibility by allowing proof of
regressivity as an inculpating factor but not allowing proof of
progressivity as an exculpating factor. But even if one believed
that antitrust institutions were capable of generating a modest
progressivity benefit if they allowed only regressivity as an inculpating factor, it would not follow that introducing incomedistribution effects into antitrust analysis would be optimal.
Not only would pursuing wealth distribution as an explicit antitrust goal add considerable expense and increase error rates in
antitrust adjudication but it would also likely come at the cost
of other antitrust goals, such as consumer welfare or allocative
efficiency. An additional regressivity factor would only have
significant purchase in antitrust cases where harmful effects
on consumer welfare or allocative efficiency could not be established. If they could be established and hence an antitrust
violation proven (with, according to the monopoly regressivity
critique, the incidental effect of advancing income progressivity), there would be no need for separate proof of income regressivity as part of the violation. Thus, if introduced as a factor in
antitrust analysis, regressivity would likely serve chiefly as a
foil to arguments about positive effects on consumer welfare or
efficiency of the challenged conduct.

Appeals, 54 J.L. & ECON. 1, 20 (2011) (concluding based on empirical study that
some antitrust cases are already too complicated for generalist judges).
233
See, e.g., Glen O. Robinson, Explaining Vertical Agreements: The Colgate
Puzzle and Antitrust Method, 80 VA. L. REV. 577, 607 (1994) (examining arguments that increasing complexity in antitrust cases favors defendants).
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Finally, even if one believed that antitrust law could be
formally adjusted to combat income regressivity and that concerns over distributive justice should trump concerns over consumer welfare and economic efficiency, it still would not follow
that antitrust law should incorporate a regressivity factor. As a
matter of comparative institutional advantage, the antitrust
system is far inferior to other branches of law and governmental authority in addressing wealth equality. As Louis Kaplow
and Steven Shavell have argued, the legal system is generally
inferior to the income tax and transfer system in the redistribution of wealth.234 By contrast, the antitrust system is reasonably competent at generating consumer welfare and economic
efficiency. It would be a mistake to deploy antitrust law in
service of an income distribution concern that it is entirely illequipped to address.
3. A Modest Role for Prosecutorial Discretion
If regressivity is not to enter antitrust analysis as a formal
factor, it might still play a small role in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion by the antitrust agencies.235 Despite
the general thesis of this Article that economy-wide distributive
effects are too complex to ascertain and the further contention
that adding an express regressivity element into antitrust analysis would be unwise, the antitrust agencies might occasionally
prioritize enforcement against anticompetitive actions with
clear and demonstrable regressive effects. Potential examples
include anticompetitive mergers between dollar stores236 or
payday lenders catering almost exclusively to low-income individuals. Conversely, they might choose not to enforce the antitrust laws in circumstances where the relevant conduct
created some degree of market power but had generally progressive wealth-distribution effects.
In considering the potential importance of prosecutorial
discretion in antitrust cases, it is important to keep in mind the
relatively limited importance of public enforcement to the anti234
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 990–98 (2001); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 676
n.14 (1994).
235
See Baker & Salop, supra note 7, at 18–20.
236
See Press Release, FTC, FTC Requires Dollar Tree and Family Dollar to
Divest 330 Stores as Condition of Merger (July 2, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/press-releases/2015/07/ftc-requires-dollar-tree-family-dollardivest-330-stores [http://perma.cc/Z5GJ-Z85Q].
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trust field.237 In recent decades, most of antitrust law has been
made in private rather than public litigation.238 In combination with the fact that regressivity would be hard to demonstrate in most cases, the predominance of private enforcement
would render any resolution for the antitrust agencies to consider regressivity in their enforcement decisions relatively
moot.
B. Antitrust and Private Redistributive Efforts
There remains the question of whether antitrust law
should entertain a limited progressivity defense for benevolent
actors—essentially, allowing defendants to escape antitrust liability by demonstrating that their conduct was intended to create a progressive redistribution of income. The law on social
welfare justifications for anticompetitive conduct is relatively
undeveloped, with few decisions explicitly addressing the question. In the Ivy League Overlap case, perhaps the decision
addressing the question most directly, the Third Circuit held
that MIT was entitled to raise as a defense the progressivity of
the program in making an MIT education affordable to a wider
pool of students.239 In light of Supreme Court precedent rejecting broad social welfare justifications for anticompetitive
conduct, the court nonetheless struck a cautious note in its
articulation of the defense, observing that MIT was not merely
arguing that its conduct “serve[d] a social benefit” but that it
“actually enhance[d] consumer choice.”240 In other words, MIT
was required to articulate its defense in the vernacular of conventional antitrust with reference to markets and consumer
sovereignty.
As noted earlier, wealth redistribution is a subset of a
larger question about social welfare justifications for otherwise
unlawful anticompetitive conduct.241 A comprehensive treatment of that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. However,
to the extent that progressivity on wealth distribution should
237
See Crane, supra note 42, at 1179 (examining the ratio between public and
private enforcement of federal antitrust laws); William F. Baxter, Separation of
Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law” Nature of Antitrust Law,
60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 682 (1982) (explaining the limitations of prosecutorial discretion in antitrust cases given the prominence of private litigation).
238
See Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, supra note 97, at 41.
239
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 677 (3d Cir. 1993).
240
Id. The court had to distinguish two earlier Supreme Court decisions, FTC
v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) and Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978), which it interpreted as rejecting social
welfare justifications for anticompetitive conduct. See 5 F.3d at 664.
241
See supra text accompanying notes 157–173.
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ever enter antitrust analysis as a defense, one might consider
three limitations on its assertion.
First, consistent with the broad thesis of this Article, it
would be inappropriate to permit a progressivity defense based
on incidental, rather than purposeful, effects of the challenged
conduct. In other words, a defendant would not be able to
immunize itself from charges of anticompetitive behavior just
by proving that the behavior happened to have progressive income-redistribution effects. Rather, the defense would need to
be limited to circumstances where the progressive redistribution effect was the primary objective of the anticompetitive action. Otherwise, confounding claims about progressivity and
regressivity could swamp run-of-the-mill antitrust cases involving ordinary commercial motivations. If a progressivity defense were to be recognized, it should be limited to instances of
genuine Tocquevillian collaboration to address a perceived social evil through mobilizations of civil society.
Relatedly, the defense should be limited to instances of
unadulterated altruism—ones where the parties imposing the
anticompetitive restraint do not stand to reap significant monopoly rents for their own benefit. In the Trial Lawyers case
involving the boycott of the D.C. court system for the ostensible
purpose of improving the quality of indigent criminal representation,242 the Supreme Court distinguished cases of pure altruism, such as those involving boycotts of discriminating
businesses for civil rights purposes, from ones where the
boycotters stood to reap an undeniable economic advantage for
themselves.243 Although that decision arose in the First
Amendment context,244 the observation has broader relevance.
There are obvious risks in allowing self-interested private individuals to create market power of which they are primary
beneficiaries.245
Finally, the progressive redistribution effect would have to
be a reasonably direct result of the anticompetitive restraint. It
would be unworkable to allow a Robin Hood defense that the
defendants extracted monopoly rents from wealthier consumers and then voluntarily redistributed them to the poor. Al242

See supra text accompanying notes 165–167.
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 425–28 (1990)
(distinguishing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
244
See supra text accompanying note 165–167.
245
See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468
(1941) (rejecting argument that defendants’ self-interested anticompetitive restrictions on pirated fashions could be justified on grounds that fashion piracy
violated state tort laws).
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though monopoly power has enabled some of the most
significant philanthropy in American history—think of John D.
Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and Bill Gates, for example—
allowing assertions about philanthropic plans for monopoly
profits would render antitrust adjudication unworkable.
In sum, there may be room in antitrust law for a benevolent
actor progressivity defense but it would need to be carefully
circumscribed. Antitrust law works best as a set of objective
principles regarding measurable economic effects in commercial markets. Concrete proof of progressivity or regressivity
from changes in market power is usually unavailable and admitting efforts to prove them could lead to systemic error.
While there may be an occasional need for flexibility in antitrust doctrine or practice to accommodate civil society initiatives focused on redistributing wealth or achieving related
social justice objectives, the scope of any such exemption
should remain narrow.
CONCLUSION
The storyline that monopoly is regressive and hence antitrust enforcement is progressive may be politically attractive,
but it is misguided as a generality. There are instances when it
is true and instances when it is false. In most instances, it is
simply unknowable. As a general matter, there is no reason to
expect that more competitive markets will increase equality. To
the contrary, competitive markets tend to distribute resources
based on demand rather than desert, which, if anything, leads
to pronounced inequality.
Part of the reason for the longstanding ideological consensus supporting antitrust enforcement in the United States has
been an understanding that, whatever their distributive effects,
more competitive markets create a larger pie. Antitrust law is
generally ill positioned to describe how the pie is allocated or to
prescribe how it should be allocated. Wealth equality does not
belong to antitrust law’s domain.

